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Energy, Environment and LNG:
Perceptions and Perspectives of
Kaleidoscopic Issues
ROBERT E. LUTZ
I. ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY IN THE SEVENTIES: SOME
PERSPECTIVES
As the keynote speaker for this Symposium, which looks for-
ward to the next decade, I think it appropriate to pause, to look
over our shoulder, as a historian might say, to the environmental
decade and the energy crisis of the Seventies. While nostalgia is
not my forte and my perspective of that particular period may be
somewhat blurred, my professional upbringing did occur during
the Seventies, providing me with some personal experiences and
an understanding of the forces and events that were at work and
have influenced where we are today.
A. The Environmental Decade: Successes and Lessons
Consistent with the intellectual and political ferment of those
times, it was quite appropriate that the environment be the issue
of the Seventies.9 It focused our attentions on the quality of life
9. While environmental issues were certainly important prior to 1970, public
consciousness and legislative initiative to address environmental problems
seemed to converge early in that decade. For an excellent chronicle of the devel-
opments and issues of the 1970's, see the Annual Reports of the U.S. Council on
Environmental Quality, published annually from 1970 to present. Noteworthy was
the signing into law on January 1, 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 et seq., which became a major weapon in the arsenal of environ-
mental litigators. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA N THE COURTS 15-23 (1973). The Act
also became an important impetus for the development of environmental depart-
ments and personnel in agency infrastructures. See R. LmoFF, A NATIONAL PoucY
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 74-141 (1976). For a description of states' parallel develop-
ment, see Yost, NEPA's Progeny: State Environmental Policy Acts, 3 ELR 50090
(1973) and Comment, "Little NEPA 's" in the Courts: Washington and Montana En-
vironmental Policy Acts are Alive and Well, 6 ELR 10216 (1976). For environmen-
that we wanted to enjoy during our lifetimes, and it responded to
our sense of obligation for future generations.'0 It also was a
fitting synthesis of past public concern, enabling us, to the disdain
of some, to divert our attentions from an ugly war which we could
not understand, could not seem to influence through political
channels, and in which many were reluctant to participate." At a
time of relative prosperity, the environmental issue enabled us to
better our lot by dealing with some very pressing concerns, over-
looked or ignored in the past, and to work at developing tools
which would allow us to plan for our future. It had all the ele-
ments of an ideal public issue which could energize the hearts
and minds of our fellow countrymen.' 2
The successes of the early part of that decade were tremen-
dous. A spate of laws was passed by state and federal legisla-
tures13 which was unequaled in scope, complexity, and length,
tal impact reporting requirements, see R. Lutz, Foreign Country, Regional and
International Environmental Assessment Requirements, in INTERDEPENDENCE-
THE LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 95-107 (1976). See generally W. RODGERS, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW 697-834 (1977).
This was also a period during which environmental law courses were included
in the curriculum of almost every law school, many schools of planning and some
engineering schools. A sort of cross-disciplinary natural science-social science ma-
jor, usually entitled Environmental Studies, was created at many universities. A
number of specialized law journals dedicated to exploring the legal, scientific and
social issues of the environment were also inaugurated, for example, the ECOLOGY
LAW QuARTERLY, which was published by the students of the University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley (Boalt Hall) in late 1970. Numerous public interest law groups
were spawned primarily with the assistance of foundations such as the Ford Foun-
dation, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the Sierra Club Defense
Fund, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Center for Law and Social Policy
(Washington, D.C.), and the Center for Law in the Public Interest (Los Angeles).
10. A number of books and articles assisted this focus and have become clas-
sics in the environmental field. See, e.g., R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); A. LEO-
PoL, A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC (1949) (republished 1966); R. RIENOW and L.
RIENOW, MOMENT IN THE SUN (1967); B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971); G.
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); and Boulding, The
Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY IN A GROW-
ING ECONOMY 3-14 (H. Jarrett ed., 1971). See also Meyers, An Introduction to Envi-
ronmental Thought: Some Sources and Some Criticisms, 50 IND. L.J. 426 (1975).
11. One of the most popular books of this era which dealt with such polit-
ical/cultural themes was Charles A. Reich's book, GR.ENING OF AMERICA (1970).
12. Not to be overlooked is that many other countries were experiencing simi-
lar phenomena. See R. Lutz, The Laws of Environmental Management: A Compar-
ative Study, 24 AMER. J. Comp. L. 447 (1976).
13. Some of the major federal environmental laws passed by Congress in-
cluded: the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 et seq.
(1976); Clean Air Act of 1970, as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. II 1978); the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972, as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. H 1978); the Occupation Safety and Health Act
of 1970, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976); the Toxic Substances Control Act of
1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (Supp. 11977); the Resources Recovery and Conserva-
tion Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (Supp. 1 1977); the Marine Protection, Re-
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and was baffling to even the finest legal minds or most brilliant
scientists.14 Often operating in areas of unknown technology,
lawmakers employed innovative legislative techniques' 5 and dele-
gated broad, discretionary powers to burgeoning bureaucracies. 16
The courts, normally untrained in scientific and technical mat-
ters,17 were the appointed settlers of disputes, frequently involv-
search and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. (1976); the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136y
(1976); the Safe Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et seq. (1976); the Wilderness Act of
1974, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976); and the Noise Control Act of 1972, as amended
by the Quiet Communities Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1976 & Supp. III
1979). For a useful collection of these laws, see WEST PuBLISmNG Co., SELECTED
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STATUTES (1981). A description of some of these laws and
their regulatory and judicial interpretations are contained in W. RODGERS, supra
note 9, and F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TREATISE, Vols. 1 and 2 (2d ed. 1978).
The state of environmental law in the middle of the decade is effectively analyzed
in DOLGN and GuILBERG, eds., FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (1974).
14. A perusal of the Clean Air Act of 1977 (CAA) will convey this point. For
an overview of the basic programs created by the CAA, see Lutz, Managing a
Boundless Resource: U.S. Approaches to Trantboundary Air Quality Control,
11 ENVT'L L. 321, 324-54, 356-67 (1981).
15. Motivated to achieve such regulatory goals as efficiency in enforcement,
compliance and technological incentives, cost-benefit assessments, and compensa-
tion for environmental damage, legislators experimented with such approaches as
marketable permits, trade-offs (or set-offs), bubbles, effluent charges, noncompli-
ance penalities and various compensation schemes. See FINDLEY and FARBER, EN-
VIRONmENTAL LAW--CASES AND MATERIALS, 268-296 (1981); and STEWART and
KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND Poucy, READINGS, MATERIALS AND NOTES (2d ed.
-1978).
16. E.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1977); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,
514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); and Industrial Union Dep't, AFL.CIO v. American Pe-
troleum Institute, 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980) (also known as the Benzene Decision).
While many environmental statutes straddle the thin line between specifying
standards and conferring unbridled discretion to agency administrators to set
standards through rulemaking, the technologically uncertain subjects of most en-
vironmental laws make this approach quite difficult for most legislatures to under-
take. To some extent, the watchman's role has been relegated by default to the
courts, which have historically (at least for the past half-century) allowed the ex-
ercise of broad agency discretion under the "delegation doctrine." More recently,
this judicial deference to the executive branch has been brought into question.
See Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 713 (1969); DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 3.15 (2d ed. 1978); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE
LJ. 575 (1972); and Symposium-Administrative Discretion, 37 L. & CoNTEMp.
PROBS. 1-215 (1972). A thoughtful discussion of these issues in light of the Ben-
zene Decision is Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Deci-
sion Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 ENvT'L. L. 301 (1980).
17. See e.g., Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 817 (1977); Levinthal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the
Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974); and Bazelon, Science and Uncer-
ing complex technological evaluation and statutory
interpretation.18 The courts eagerly undertook this task (a role
which courts traditionally shun),19 which had complicated and
often contradicted economic, political, and scientific underpin-
nings and implications. A national consciousness about environ-
mental problems and crisis developed.20 Commencing as the
Environmental Movement, it quickly became not a movement at
all, but rather a broadly based citizens' concern for issues of local,
as well as national, scope relevant to everyone's quality of life.
The educational contribution of this process generated a greater
public understanding of the relationship of man to nature and to
technology. It created a new understanding of the carrying capac-
ity of our land. Economic growth did not have to take a back seat
to environmental control; they could co-exist. 21 In fact, for the
long-term health of our fragile planet, they must.22
These aspects of the environmental decade, however, had their
costly baggage and share of lessons. In one sense, we discovered
that such complex problems are so interrelated with the social,
economic, and political fabric of our society that they are not solv-
able by the statutory stroke of a pen, no matter how ingenious the
design of a law. While crushing to every legislator's, and perhaps
every lawyer's ego, having a law on the books does not make it
conclusive that the problem is, or can be, solved. Second,
programmatic coherence and facility enforcement effectiveness,
and sufficient personnel (in terms of training and numbers) were
found in -some instances to be grossly deficient.23 Third, the idea
tainty: A Jurist's View, 5 HARv. ENVT'L L. REV. 209 (1981) (hereinafter cited as
Bazelon II).
18. E.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
19. Id. These difficulties, especially the need courts have to resolve disputed
scientific and technical issues, have generated proposals for an "Environmental
Court" or "Science Court." See Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1058 (1977) and Comment, Attorney General's Report Rejects Establishing an
Environmental Court, 4 ELR 10019 (1974).
20. See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, PUBLIC OPINION ON ENVIRONMENTAL IS-
SUES: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY (U.S.G.P.O., 1980). A public
opinion poll conducted by Opinion Research Corporation in 1977 also advised:
".. . [E] nvironmental protection no longer is the exclusive domain of a handful of
professional social critics and environmental activists, but the continuing concern
of the public as a whole." CouNcIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIrY, ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY-THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT* OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUA rY 423 (1980).
21. See id., at 408-9; see also SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL, ECONOMICS AS
IFPEOPLE MATTERED (1973).
22. See Boulding, supra note 10, and Hardin, supra note 10.
23. For example, when the decade began, few were sufficiently trained in
cross-disciplinary subjects to do the sort of impact analysis required by environ-
mental impact statements. Industry personnel and the new governmental agen-
cies' recruits had an insufficient background. Universities could supply only an
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that our institutions are capable of any task, if only provided the
authority, was seriously shaken. Specialized agencies proved in-
capable of mastering their destinies, much less issuing timely,
legislatively prescribed rules. 24 Legislatures demonstrated that
they were ill-equipped to creatively address the difficult issues of
a highly technological society and yet resist the entreaty of spe-
cial interest.25 Although many will disagree, the courts also have
not proven fully qualified to handle the social, political, economic,
and technological questions that the legislators have left for
them. 2 6 Fourth, while we focused virtually all our attention on the
problems of our environment, the world was changing politically,
economically, and ecologically. The decisions and alliances that
would have a profound impact on our future global environment
were being formulated without our full participation or
contribution.27
So, the decade that began with a bang literally heard "round
inexperienced and untrained labor force most of whom had a scientific or techni-
cal background in single disciplines. Consequently, the early Seventies was a pe-
riod of on-job training.
24. Many environmental statutes contain deadlines for the issuance of stan-
dards, reports, etc. But because of the difficulty of the prescribed task, informa-
tion shortages, required interagency or intergovernmental consultation,
insufficient personnel to carry out the task, and the lack of an adequate sanction
or remedy for such noncompliance, many of the deadlines have not been met. In
defense of the agencies, many deadlines were set unreasonably short.
25. Every major environmental issue became the battleground of environmen-
tal interest groups (for example, Sierra Club) and industry organizations (for ex-
ample, Chamber of Commerce, American Petroleum Institute). See also
Commission Recommendations, in Envt'l Rptr--Current Developments (BNA)
2074-2080 (Mar. 6, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Commission].
26. See note 16 supra; contra, SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY
FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1971); and Lutz and McCarey, Standing on the Side of the
Environment: A Statutory Prescription for Citizen Participation, 1 EcoL. LQ. 561
(1971).
27. See 0. ScHACTER, SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES (1977); Declaration on
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1, 1974, U.N.GA.
Res. 4201 (S-VI), 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974),
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974); Program of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, May 1, 1974, U.N.G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), 6 (Special)
U.M. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 720
(1974); and LuTz, Directions of Environmental Law in the International Systerm"
An Assessment of Tasks and Challenges for Lawyers, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLLu-
TION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM (McCaffrey and Lutz,
eds., 1978). See also MUKDAsm, The OPEC Process, 104 DAEDALUS 207 (1975); THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, NORTH-SOUTH-A
PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL (1980) ("Brandt Commission Report"); and Council on
Environmental Quality and Department of State, The Global 2000 Report to the
President, Vol. I (Summary Report), Vol. 1 (Technical Report) (1980).
the world,"28 concluded not so much with a whimper, but with a
sigh-a sigh of relief from those who had opposed environmental
legislation and the overreaching of government, and a sigh of ex-
haustion from those who had worked unrelentingly to encourage
the adoption of programs designed to improve the quality of life. 29
One might well query: why should a movement with such prom-
ise, high aspirations, and broad support conclude the decade with
merely a sigh?
B. Energy Crises--1973, et seq.
A possible explanation to the above question is that the wind
was taken out of the environmental sail by the Arab Oil Embargo
of 1973 and the subsequent governmental and public obsession
with -the energy crisis.30 Of course, the energy crisis had been
brewing for some time, and its prospect for widespread economic
and social dislocation was known to those who watched Arab poli-
tics and international affairs.31 However, the United States' vul-
nerability to the foreign manipulation of energy supply and price
was a surprise to many, and the 1973 Oil Embargo quickly made
energy the major issue of the times. It affected our politics, eco-
nomics, foreign policy, and national security. In its relatively
short life, it had a number of lasting consequences. The embargo
made the American public conscious of the widening gap between
energy consumption and domestic production and of our unaccus-
tomed, but growing dependence on foreign supplies. Energy
prices which had lagged behind for many years were suddenly
climbing at a rate which placed them well beyond the rate of in-
flation.3 2 Attention was focused on our public institutions' abili-
ties to present a coherent national policy to deal with energy
problems and to generate domestic development programs.33
28. The environmental issue was "internationalized" by the Stockholm Declar-
ation of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, at Stock-
holm, Sweden, on June 16, 1972. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11
IJ.M. 1416 (1972). See also Lutz, supra note 12, for a comparative assessment of
the surge of national legislative efforts of more than sixteen countries.
29. Despite continuing efforts during most of the Seventies to dismantle
(amend, revise) the framework of environmental regulation, much of it remains
intact. Although these efforts continue (see Commission, supra note 25), the strat-
egy of many environmental groups is focused on refining the machinery to en-
hance and strengthen compliance and enforcement programs.
30. Many of these developments are chronicled by ENERGY USERS REPORT-
CuRRENT REPORT (BNA).
31. See R. KRUEGER, THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL OIL, A REPORT
FOR THE FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION ON U.S. FRMS AND GOVERNMENT Poi,
icy, 37-81- (1975); and SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS 186-220 (1975).
32. See generally J.N. Moore, Foreign Policy Dimensions of the Crisis in Oil, 17
WILAM:ETE L. REV. 111, 113-15 (1980).
33. See id., at 111-39; Stobaugh and Yergin, Energy: An Emergency Telescoped,
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From these experiences,3 4 we learned that there are no single,
narrow paths to reliable energy supply and controllable energy
demand. The range of energy choices is indeed broad. Because
the national resource base is so diverse, there is room for improv-
ing our efficiency, and there are a potpourri of needs.35 Real,
workable choices to our current approaches do exist, but they do
not automatically occur. There is a need for positive and enlight-
ened action by lawmakers, administrators, industry leaders, and
citizens. In short, "the role of energy is too pervasive and the in-
terests too manifold for any expectation that there will be a sim-
ple consensus." 36
Three other observations, focusing on the nature of the United
States' policy and legal development, are relevant. First, the
United States' institutional perception of a need for an energy
policy was late coming. Consequently, United States policies in
the economic, national security, research and development, and
environmental areas had been formulated prior to the focus on
development of an energy policy. Therefore, an accommodation
was necessary, and the dynamics of that process have been ex-
tremely difficult to orchestrate, 7 to the dissatisfaction of both
government and, probably, to the ultimate detriment of the con-
suming public.38
Second, the institutions of our country operate very much on a
58 FOREIGN AFF. 563 (1980). See also R. KRUEGER, supra note 31, at 83-113; Dreyfus,
Federal Energy Organization: A Staff Analysis, Prepared for Committee on Inte-
rior and Insular Affairs, Ser. No. 93-6 (2941), 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); S. Abbasi,
Federal Energy Reorganization: Historical Perspective, in Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, Federal Energy Reorganization: Historical Perspective, Ser.
No. 94-46 (92-136), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (Comm. Print). See generally W.
RODGERS, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 1-23
(1979).
34. See ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION, A TIME TO CHOOSE
AMERICA'S ENERGY FUTURE 1-17 (1974).
35. Id. at 19-111; see also STOBAUGH and YERGIN (eds.), ENERGY FUTURE (1979).
36. Rose, Energy Policy in the U.S., 230 ScIENTmFc AM. (Jan. 1974).
37. Id.; see also Smernoff, Energy Policy Interactions in the United States, En-
ergy Policy (Sept. 1973), reprinted in Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Energy Policy Papers, Ser. No. 93-43 (92-78), 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 73-90,
(Comm. Print 1974).
38. Some would contend that these difficulties are to be expected in a hetero-
geneous, democratic society. For a discussion of the many considerations neces-
sary for the formulation of a national energy policy, see Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, Considerations in the Formulation of National Energy
Policy, Ser. No. 92-4, 92d Cong. Ist Sess. (Comm. Print 1971).
crisis management basis. 39 When a problem arises, the appropri-
ate legislature responds by passing laws regulating the offending
party. Translating bad laws into a workable, enforceable regula-
tory system is not easy. In the rush to do something, bureaucra-
cies, which were already under fire for overreaching and
overzealous programs, received mandates to do more with less
and to achieve dubious and hastily composed objectives. The
painful process of reviewing institutional arrangements and tasks
and reevaluating basic governmental power relationships is at
hand,40 perhaps partially, as a result of the lack of institutional re-
sponse capability during the early energy crisis. The bifurcation
of approaches for dealing with energy development and environ-
mental quality suggests incorrectly that one is not compatible
with the other and emphasizes the need for a comprehensive re-
assessment and approach.
Third, the ordeal of change or future shock 4' of the energy crisis
has had its social and psychological costs and benefits. A public
skepticism of government was engendered by the crisis. Citizens
seriously questioned the quality of leadership, the effectiveness of
the executive and legislative branches to respond to major crises,
and the ability of our nation to be secure from foreign manipula-
tion. Serious economic and social dislocations have taken their
toll on various segments of society, necessitating a reorientation
by families to deal with the twin scourges of inflation and unem-
ployment. Some secondary effects, however, have been quite
beneficial for our society as a whole. Catapulting us from the
post-World War II era of thoughtless energy and material con-
sumption, the energy crisis made it necessary to become conser-
vation conscious. The fact of international economic
interdependence of the United States was dramatically impressed
upon our citizens, who had long considered our economic stability
and strength an ingrown, self-contained phenomenon. The pros-
perity of the United States no longer depends merely upon its
39. See Lindbloom, The Science of "Muddling Through", 19 PUB. AD. 79 (Spring
1979). For perspectives on the planning versus "fighting fires" debate, see gener-
ally ELLICKSON and TARLocK, LAND-USE CONTROLS, CASES AND MATERIALS 361-75
(1981).
40. Certainly no stranger to our system, various governmental reform efforts
are afoot. Some focus on agency authority, responsiveness, and procedures (e.g.,
AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM (1979));
others address the basic distribution of governmental authority (for example, the
so-called Sagebrush Rebellion). See also LuTz, Getting into Deep Water: Emerg-
ing Environmental Regimes and Jurisdictional Conflicts of the Coastal Belt, in
CENTER FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES ANNUAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
(1977).
41. See E. HOFFER, THE ORDEAL OF CHANGE (1963) and A. TOFFLER, FUTURE
SHOCK (1970), both dealing with the personal and societal difficulties of change.
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productive capacity; it is inextricably connected with that of other
nations.
II. LNG-A CASE STUDY PAR EXCELLENCE
With this limited perspective of the environmental decade and
energy crisis of the Seventies, the focus today is appropriately on
the future, the new decade of the Eighties. Our task is to investi-
gate the subject of liquefied natural gas in Southern California. It
is a topic which introduces an interesting and exciting story, one
which has all the ingredients of a modern day human drama: in-
ternational intrigue, adventure on the high seas, and even a touch
of the Old West. Consider some of the recent headlines of articles
in local newspapers: "LNG Battle, Lull in the Storm over Point
Conception";42 "LNG Not Welcome, But Needed";43 "Indians Take
LNG Fight to Court."" Over the course of this project, there were
undoubtedly many other headlines, and they might have read:
LNG, Gasly State of Affairs; and LNG, the Burning Issue of our
State.45 These do not compare with the rhetoric of President
Carter in declaring the United States' energy effort, "the moral
equivalent of war," but they do emphasize the highly politicized
and emotional character of the LNG controversy.
When one considers LNG's cradle to consumer chain, the intri-
cate technological, legal, and public policy concerns of this multi-
stage process become evident. The process of LNG production to
delivery involved in this proposal for Southern California in-
cludes: exploitation, liquefaction, and storage in Indonesia or at a
foreign location; LNG transport to California by ship; unloading at
a California coastal site; revaporizing and storage here; and distri-
bution to other centers by pipeline or other forms of
transportation.46
42. L.A. Times, Oct. 14, 1979, § 2, at 1.
43. Id. Oct. 17, 1979, § 2, at 4.
44. Id. Sept. 28, 1979.
45. The author expressly assumes no responsibility for the humor, or lack
thereof, of any puns.
46. See Balzar, Liquified Natural Gas Safety, The State's Latest Energy Con-
flict, 8 CAL. J. 220 (1977); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ALTERNATIVE EN-
ERGY FUTURES, PART 1: THE FUTURE OF LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS IMPORTS-
SUMMARY 17, 19 (1980); and COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNrrED STATES, REPORT
ON THE NATURAL GAS SHORTAGE: THE ROLE OF IMPORTED LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS
(1975); see also Comment, Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal Siting in the California
Coastal Zone: The Scope of Permissible State Authority, 9 PAC. LJ. 1069, 1075-77
(1978).
A. Technological Issues47
At each of these stages, important issues are presented which
reflect on the responsiveness of technology in protecting the pub-
lic safety.48 Some examples are: the safety of ships in transit,49
the safety of unloading and revaporizing LNG,50 the safe storage
and distribution of LNG,51 and the degree to which earthquake
protection can be provided to make facilities sufficiently earth-
47. The dearth of discussion under this topic heading compared to the others
is not meant to suggest that technological issues are in any sense less important.
To the contrary, many of these considerations are basic to the existence of the
LNG project, and indeed are fundamentally applicable to our technological
society. Their brief treatment merely reflects the general emphasis of the
Symposium on legal and policy issues, and the author's lack of confidence in his
ability to effectively translate the highly technical matters involved into laymen's
terms.
48. Public safety concerns are the starting point for almost any discussion of
LNG. There are "worst case" scenarios and even tragic experiences to cite. See
generally Weinberg, Cargo of Fire: A Call for Stricter Regulation of Liquefied Nat-
ural Gas Shipment and Storage, 4 FoRDHAm URS. L.J. 495 (1976). There are even
more tempered discussions referring to risk assessments. See, e.g., Comment,
supra note 46 and Greenwald, LNG Carrier Safety: A Guide to the System of Fed-
eral Regulation, 9 J. MAR. L. & Comm. 155 (1978)).
49. Public concern for maritime safety has been accompanied by in-
creased recognition that ocean transportation is not simply a series of dis-
crete events pertaining to a cargo, a vessel, or a voyage. Rather ocean
transportation operates as a system, and safe operation requires measures
designed to take effect during every stage. LNG transportation is a pro-
duct of developments in the science of cryogenics which studies the be-
havior of materials at very low temperatures. Major breakthroughs were
made in the search for metals capable of containing liquid oxygen and hy-
drogen to fuel rocket propulsion, and for vessels capable of transporting
these rocket fuels. It is fitting that ocean transportation of LNG, born in
the space age should be among the first maritime trades subjected to a
searching and 5 systematic safety analysis.... The LNG cargo itself is
by no means as hazardous as many liquid bulk chemicals transported in
maritime commerce.... The unique problems of transporting LNG
center upon vessel structures and vessel cargo tanks which must be made
of materials that can reliably contain so cold a liquid, and upon the trans-
fer of the LNG between ship and shore without spills.
Greenwald, id. at 155-56, 160.
Shipping safety, in particular the structure of the ship, the LNG storage tanks,
precautions to prevent leakage and spillage, and ship personnel qualifications are
all regulated by federal and international law. See id., at 165-82; and Weinberg,
supra note 48, at 507-10.
50. See LA. Times, Apr. 20, 1980, § 2, at 1; Weinberg, supra note 48, at 496-97.
See also JAQUETrE, PossBILrES AN PRoBABILIrIES IN ASSESSMENT OF THE
HAZARDS OF THE IMPORTATION OF LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (April 1975) (Rand
Corp. Public. P-5411); W. KING, ON THE FLUID MECHANICS AND HEAT TRANSFER OF
LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS Spnus (June 1975) (Rand Corp. Public. P-5396); and F.
MURRAY, ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION OF VAPORIZED LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (Feb.
1975) (Rand Corp. Public P-5360).
51. See LA. Times, Apr. 20; 1980, § 2, at 1; Southern California Gas Co., The
Role of Gas in Southern California (May 1980); Balzar, supra note 46; and Com-
ment, supra note 46. See also California Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal Act of
1977, CAL. PuB. UT. CODE §§ 5550, 5562, 5584, 5611 (West 1980).
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quake-proof.5 2 All the issues are difficult and call for the latest
technology and comprehensive technological assessments. The
concern for whether science is capable of assessing the technolog-
ical risks involved, and how a decision maker or citizen ought to
evaluate such data are, of course, overriding questions.
B. Legal Considerations
As you might imagine, the LNG case study is a law professor's
dream come true, providing a rich number of legal issues for con-
sideration.5 3 The scenario of LNG development to distribution
raises difficult questions about the right of private property own-
ership versus the civil liberty to freely exercise religious beliefs54
and versus aboriginal property claims.55 Assertions by nearby
property owners raise constitutional and state statutory questions
about whether they have compensable property interests5 6 and,
further, whether they have standing to enjoin activity at the LNG
site.57 Even the authority of private companies to employ emi-
nent domain powers is brought into question.58
No energy development is free from a myriad of legal questions
52. See L.A. Times, Nov. 17, 1979, § 2, at 1; id., Apr. 20, 1980, § 2, at 1, col. 4.
53. For suggestions regarding curriculum for a law school energy law course,
see Fischer, Book Review (Energy and Natural Resources Law by W. Rodgers),
68 GEORGETOWN L.J. 267 (1979).
54. "The Indians, and particularly the Chumash, believe that while all land is
sacred, the Point Conception area is especially so since it symbolizes the so-called
Western Gate through which spirits pass from this life. Locating an LNG terminal
in the area would be desecrating the land, they believe." L.A. Times, Oct. 14, 1979,
§ 2. See also id., Sept. 3, 1980, § 2, at 4, col. 2; and Mar. 11, 1976, § 6, at 5, col. 4. See
generally GETCHES, ROSENFELT and WILKENSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW-CASES AND
MATERIALS (1979) (hereinafter cited as GETCHES et al).
55. See generally Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 62 YALE L.J. 348 (1953);
Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28 (1947); and GETCHES et al, supra
note 54.
56. This issue has been posed primarily by the Bixby Ranch Co., a local prop-
erty owner in the Point Conception area: "The remoteness and rural quality of the
property would certainly be destroyed and maybe the property would be rendered
valueless." L.A. Times, Oct. 14, 1979.
57. Id.
58. See Liquefied Natural Gas Act of 1977, CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5590 (West
1980):
The construction and operation of an LNG terminal related facilities, and
access road and the creation and maintenance of an area of low popula-
tion density surrounding the terminal are public uses and purposes for
which the power of eminent domain may be exercised pursuant to Title 7
(commencing with Section 1230.010) of Part 3 of the (California] Code of
Civil Procedure.
Id.
asking whether federal or state law is applicable, 59 and certainly,
the proposed LNG project is no exception. Here, concerns about
the preemptive effect of federal laws pervade almost every aspect
of the project. 60 The scope of the tenth amendment 6' and the un-
certainty of the state's role in regulating phases of LNG develop-
ment 62 continue to keep all affected parties a little in doubt as to
which law applies.
The field of administrative law is not left untouched by this con-
troversy; in fact, it raises some of the most interesting contempo-
rary legal issues, especially for those of us who like to explore the
field of institutional reform. Administrative agency jurisdiction
and procedures are general subjects of this focus. Serious mat-
ters such as the efficacy and appropriateness of protracted permit
procedures pose important due process issues, which must be
tested against the government's legitimate interests in protecting
the public welfare.6 3 In an era of legislative grants of broad dis-
59. Energy development typically involves landuse decisions which, of course,
traditionally are local zoning matters. However, as development of this nature has
taken on national interest in recent years, federal laws sometimes direct the pace,
type, and location of such activities. States that are concerned about their eco-
nomic development and environmental quality also become involved. See gener-
ally NATURAL RESOUCES DEFENSE CouNcIL, INc., LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1977).
60. The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI(2), and the tenth amendment,
U.S. Const. amend. X, the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the
Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, are the Constitutional provisions
usually involved in such debates. Some recent cases in this area include: Kleppe
v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975);
U.S. v. Ohio Dept. of Highway Safety, 15 ERC 1273 (6th Cir. 1980); Friends of the
Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); British
Airways Bd. v. Port of New York, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977); and Northern States
Power Co. v. Minn., 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affid, 405 U.S. 1035 (1971).
For some useful perspectives on these issues, see Stewart, Pryamids of Sacri.
fice?, Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National En-
vironmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977); Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear
Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Preempted?, 7 ECOLOGY L. Q. 679 (1979); and Com-
ment, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause,
87 HARv. L. REV. 1762 (1974).
61. Id.
62. [W]hether the state is preempted in its attempt to eliminate preclu-
sive federal determination of terminal sites turns initially upon whether
there exists a conflict between the siting provisions of the LNG Terminal
Act and some existing federal statute or statutes. The conflict ... may
manifest itself either in terms of an obvious contradiction in statutory lan-
guage or, in a more subtle fashion, by the existence of a state statute re-
pugnant to the objectives of Congress.
Comment, supra note 46, at 1086.
63. Much of the due process development of the 1960s and early Seventies fo-
cused on the protection of legitimate interests known as the "New Property." See
C. Reich, New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Today, as if the pendulum has
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cretion to agencies,6 4 the LNG case presents numerous instances
in which the scope of agency discretion might be appropriately
questioned. Silhouetted against these administrative law issues
are the active efforts of state legislatures65 and Congress 66 to dra-
matically revise administrative law in the United States. 6 7 This
creates an atmosphere of uncertainty, while parties to the LNG
project grapple with the existing process. Certainly, the reliance
being placed on the judiciary to resolve competing policies also
raises fundamental issues about our legal system to which no law
school student is a stranger.68
The foreign aspects of LNG development do not necessarily es-
cape the application of United States law. In fact, the extraterrito-
rial reach of certain United States laws may be relevant.69 If they
are, they would have a significant impact on such a project and
raise extremely interesting jurisdictional issues.7 0 Moreover, in-
ternational law applies to much of the international transporta-
tion of LNG. Despite the constantly changing nature of legal
developments in this area, liability and transport safety are gener-
ally regulated by the IMCO Conventions. 7 1 The law of the sea 72
swung back, there is great concern about what is the appropriate amount of proce-
dural due process for agency rulemaking and other types of activities affecting, in
particular, economic interests. See generally RABIN, Administrative Law in Tran-
sition.: A Discipline in Search of an Organizing Principle, PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (Rabin ed.), 13-14 (1979).
64. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
65. The Uniform Law Commissioners' Revised Model State Administrative
Procedure Act of 1961 (13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 341-448 (Pamphlet 1979)), which has
served as a model act for twenty-six states and influenced another twenty-three.
See GELLHORN, BYSE & STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CASES AND COMMENTS
1148 (7th ed. 1979) (presently undergoing revision).
66. Proceedings of the National Conference on Federal Regulation; see gener-
ally Roads to Reform, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 123-409 (Spring 1980).
67. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASS'N., supra note 40.
68. See generally TOMAIN, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 72-103 (1981).
69. See, e.g., the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 et seq.
(1976), is by Executive Order, if not by force of the law itself, applicable to various
activities occurring abroad. (See Exec. Order No. 12114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1979)).
Similarly, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, antitrust and securities laws have
been applied to foreign activities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 87-170, 1981); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 10 (1965).
70. Id.
71. The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) has
sponsored three multilateral conventions relating to various aspects of maritime
pollution: (1) 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of
the Sea by Oil, entered into force July 1958, 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.IA.S. No. 4900, 327
delineates the rights and duties applicable to, primarily, nations
engaged in ocean activities, 73 but events surrounding its revision
cast doubt as to the permanency of any of the Draft Convention's
provisions74 and the state of customary international law princi-
ples in this area.75
Last, financial responsibility for such energy projects is deter-
mined by the financing method being employed to underwrite the
LNG terminal.76 This matter is of utmost significance because
public utility energy projects are becoming more expensive and
increasingly require tremendous front end capital expenditures. 77
U.N.T.S. 3; 1962 Amendments to the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollu-
tion of the Sea by Oil, entered into force May 18, 1967, 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No.
6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332; 1969 Amendments to the 1954 Convention for the Prevention
of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, annexed to IMCO Assembly Res. A. 175(vi), Oct.
21, 1969; (2) International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, at Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 25
(1970); and (3) International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Dam-
age, at Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 I.LM. 45 (1970).
72. This is a generic term referring largely to the treaty-made and customary
international law governing the rights and duties of states in the oceans. Promi-
nent amongst the convention-made law are the results of the United Nations First
Conference on the Law of the Sea, which were the 1958 Geneva Conventions:
(1) on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into
force for the U.S., Sept. 30, 1962); (2) on the Continental Shelf, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force for the U.S., June 10, 1964);
(3) on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.IAS. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force for the U.S., Sept. 10, 1964); and (4) on Fishing
and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.IA.S. No.
5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (entered into force for the U.S., March 20, 1966).
Since 1973, the United Nations has convened the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II). The Conference is presently consider-
ing the Draft Convention of the Law of the Sea, A/Conf. 62/WP.10/Rev. 3 (27
August 1980), the culmination of at least four earlier draft documents. See Oxman,
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth Session
(1980), 75 A.J.I.L 211 (1981).
73. See Draft Convention, id.
74. Just when the treaty process was entering its final phase, the Reagan Ad-
ministration indicated it would conduct a reassessment of the U.S. positions taken
in the negotiations over the last eight years. This was done despite the support of
three prior Administrations for the U.S. Delegation's negotiations and
compromises.
75. See generally Lutz, National Hegemony and International Suzerainty in
the Oceans: The Environmental Implications of the Law of the Seas Negotiations,
6 Irr' Bus. LAW. 174 (1978).
76. See Balzar, supra note 46, at 222-23; see generally Fischer, The New Syn-
thetic Fuels Program: Boomlet or Bust, 16 TULSA L.J. 357, 378-406 (1981); and LuTz,
Expenditure Incentives, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION ON EVALU-
ATION ON INCENTIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVER-
SION TECHNOLOGY (Washom, Nilles, Lutz, et al., Contrib.) (1976).
77. Financing is needed to pay for construction of a liquefaction plant at
Gravina Point on the south coast of Alaska, the receiving terminal and
regasiflication plant at Point Conception and the special tankers needed to
transport the gas-8,150 nautical miles from Indonesia and 2,050 miles
from Alaska. The Indonesia liquefaction terminal will be built in Sumatra
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C. Policy Considerations
The policy issues involved, such as the role of law in society,
are equally tantalizing to the student and, like other issue areas,
these questions may overlap the technological and legal catego-
ries.78 Although many possibilities come to mind, only a few ba-
sic ones will be ventured here.
Since a percentage of the LNG doming to Point Conception
would be produced in Indonesia, a major question, perplexing to
nearly a decade of energy planners, is what should be our depen-
dence on foreign energy sources? 79 With much of foreign energy
supply in our country managed by private companies, the related
concern of whether government ought to play a greater role in ar-
ranging or making foreign supply agreements is also relevant.80
by Pertamina, the Governmentowned petroleum firm that will sell the gas
to the California companies.
L.A. Times, Sept. 28, 1979, § I, at 1.
The entire project is predicted to cost 3 billion dollars. Id., Jan. 12, 1980, § I, at 1,
col. 1.
Other considerations are involved. Should the ultimate consumer today pay for
energy development which will benefit customers tomorrow, or in other words,
should there be prepayment? Also, what happens with respect to cost overruns,
costs incurred because of regulatory or legislative delays, or even the ultimate re-
jection of the project by government or by developers (based on economic in-
feasibility)? Can these expenses be internalized in current or future rate
structures? See generally TomAIN, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 104-35 (1981).
78. Technological considerations in particular, while often demanding a tech-
nical and scientific understanding for effective deliberation, in the end involve ba-
sic matters of public policy.
79. A half decade after 'Project Independence' the United States im-
ports about forty-five percent of its oil rather than the earlier thirty to
forty percent dependency.... OPEC control over most of the surplus oil
available for export prevents a free oil market and has resulted in re-
peated oil shocks as prices quadrupled in 1973-1974 and more than
doubled again in 1979. Tight supplies, threats of political embargo, recent
OPEC policies reducing production to keep sup plies tight, and the relative
inelasticity of short-term demand for oil creatednear panic in oil markets.
These factors also made prices highly sensitive to minor shortfalls in sup-
ply or even to expectations of such shortfalls.
Moore, Foreign Policy Dimensions of the Crisis in Oil, 17 WLLAMETTE L. REV. 111,
113 (1980).
80. Certainly there are factors in any private company-foreign country energy
arrangement which should concern the federal government. For example, the sta-
bility of a foreign country's government ought to be a major criterion in any as-
sessment of whether dependence is appropriate. Other political factors might also
include the ideological differences between supplier and supplied, since such
grounds may be used to terminate or alter the terms of concession agreements.
See generally WESTON, FALc & D'AmATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER
713-37 (1980).
Although before OPEC, this concern held limited significance, today it is regu-
In these hard energy times, should not supply be related to real
need?81 If so, what role should conservation play, and who should
determine it?
On a domestic scale, California, with an increased natural gas
supply, would become a "have" state. In this new epoch of energy
planning, what will be California's responsibility to "have not"
states?82 A related planning concern, but more a matter of state
policy, is the appropriate location of LNG terminals. Specifically,
should low density areas be considered desirable over those
which have well developed harbors with industrial infrastruc-
tures?83 Are there comparative advantages of onshore sites to off-
shore ones? Also, the relative responsibilities between
government and the energy industry in energy site selection
changes from state to state.84 Some states direct government to
make the choice or at least narrow the possibilities; other states
give industry a free hand, limited by regulations and various site
criteria primarily designed to achieve safety objectives.85 Is there
a proper balance amongst these approaches? Should private in-
dustry make initial site selections and be responsible for building
and supplying gas, particularly when the sources are interna-
tional; or should there be federal or state procedures set aside for
siting?
It would certainly be difficult to identify any environmental or
energy achievement of the past decade which does not have the
stamp of citizen involvement to its credit. But, as issues become
larly a matter of multilateral discussion, for example, the U.S. concern with West
Germany's plans to obtain natural gas from the Soviet Union expressed at the Ot-
tawa Economic Conference of early August 1981. See generally "Summit of a
Strong Seven," TIME, Aug. 3, 1981.
Obviously, no western industrialized nation is immune from reliance on foreign
energy and mineral resources, butsome arrangements seriously place national ec-
onomic stability in jeopardy. For example, the general U.S. vulnerability, as a re-
sult of OPEC policies, to fluctuations of the supply and price of oil is well known.
Aside from these concerns, U.S. dependence on Libyan oil has made normal diplo-
matic responses to the outrageous international antics of Colonel Khadafi quite
difficult on a number of occasions.
81. See L.A. Times, Jan. 21, 1981, § I, at 1, col. 1.
82. See generally "The Angry West vs. The Rest," NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 1979, at
31-40. This issue is becoming central to numerous resource development pro-
grams. See, e.g., Testimony and Prepared Statement by Robert E. Lutz, in Hear-
ings on H.R. 6218 (Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1975),
before the House Ad Hoc Select Comm. on Outer Continental Shelf, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1240-47 (1976). On an international level, the issue is also evi-
dent; it is euphemistically referred to as the "North-South Debate" and best typi-
fied by the developments surrounding the "New International Economic Order."
See note 27 supra.
83. See Comment, supra note 46, at 1073-75, 1079-83.
84. See, e.g., JOHNSON & HILDRETH, COASTAL ZONE LAW AND PoUcY 601-702
(1980).
85. Id.
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more complex and the expenses associated with delay increase,
we should strive to provide the proper role and mode for citizen
participation.86 The associated question of how much process is
due under state and federal constitutions establishes the parame-
ters of the search for the combination. Whether current ap-
proaches of multiple agencies and processes improve the
prospects of good decision-making, or whether it is detrimental to
the adversaries as well as the general public, are issues, not only
of the moment, but also of the future. A close look at institutional
reform efforts directed at limiting traditional citizen access to the
process is merited. In particular, what are the prospects that in-
stitutional override or fast-track 87 devices will help achieve good
decisions and provide due process?
D. The Fourth and Fifth Dimensions: Jurisdictions and
Constituencies
If one spreads over these concerns the particular jurisdictional
aspects relating to international, national, state, and local levels of
government, there will be a complicated set of factors to consider.
Add to that the myriad of constituencies, such as: industry,
chambers of commerce, landowners, city governments, Indians,
environmental organizations, state governments, and the federal
government, all attempting to influence decision makers and
policymakers. Each LNG concern thus becomes a multi-dimen-
sional, multi-faceted issue.
II. ENGAGING THE FUTURE
The Symposium that follows explores many of these aspects.
From an analysis of the LNG experience in California, lessons are
being learned and recorded that will assist the assessment of
other siting and energy development activities.
Recognizing the complexity of these concerns, one might con-
clude that solving energy problems in a way that is sensitive to
environmental concerns is an impossible task. While one must
appreciate the extreme complexity and difficulty of the energy
86. See Bazelon 11, supra note 17, at 214-15; see generally STEWART & KRIER,
supra note 15, at 811-37.
87. See, e.g., Fischer, Allocating Decisionmaking in the Field of Energy Re-
source Development: Some Questions and Suggestions, 22 ARiz. L REV. 1001
(1980).
supply process, do not despair! This is the time that choices af-
fecting our future can still thoughtfully be made. It is the respon-
sibility of all citizens to find ways to provide a better future; and
lawyers, uniquely trained for such tasks, must not fail to ably ap-
ply their analytical skills in this endeavor. The solutions must not
be provincial ones, improving only the lot of a special locale or pa-
rochial interest. Our community is a larger unit involving an inte-
gration of city, state, nation, globe, and universe. In an
environmental, economic, and energy sense, our destinies are in-
deed linked to those of fellow citizens, other peoples, and other
nations.
We should not be guilty of the sin of our elders who tended to
disparage a consideration of the future in their planning for the
present. We must look to long-term as well as short-term solu-
tions. We must be aware that despite our individual advances,
we, as a country and people, are integral to a global and even uni-
versal system. The recently issued Global 2000 Report88 makes a
poignant point which is worth repeating and hopefully will pro-
vide an additional perspective for these efforts:
The world in 2000 will be different from the world today in important
ways. There will be more people. There will be fewer resources to go
around .... The environment will have lost important life-supporting ca-
pabilities .... Prices will be higher... in real terms, not merely in infla-
tionary terms .... The world will be more vulnerable both to natural
disaster and to disruptions from human causes .... Finally, it must be
emphasized that if public policy continues generally unchanged, the world
will be different as a result of lost opportunities. 89
And remember, the proposed Southern California LNG project is
only a twenty-year partial solution.90
Thank you.
88. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE
GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT-ENTERING THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY,
Vol. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GLOBAL 2000 REPORT]. See also COUNCIL ON EN-
VIRONMENTAL QUAIrTY AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GLOBAL FUTURE: TIME TO ACT,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON GLOBAL RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT AND POPULATION
(Jan. 1981), providing an action plan for responding to the GLOBAL 2000 REPORT.
89. See GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, id., at 39-40.
90. Southern California Gas Co., The Role of Gas in Southern California, 18
(Booklet, May 1980).
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Nelson: Thank you Professor Lutz for those comments, particu-
larly for the questions you have posed with which we will be deal-
ing very shortly.
Moderator: We want to use this particular panel time to discuss
the process of developing and utilizing an energy source; the
ramifications of why we choose energy sources; what the particu-
lar problems are that they pose for us as a source; the decision-
making with regard to such things as safety factors, cost benefits,
and cost effectiveness; and other similar things. A little bit later
in the panel we will also discuss the process of utilizing those en-
ergy sources as it applies, for instance, to the state level and then
to the federal level, and to what extent the federal level takes pre-
cedence over the state level under the Supremacy Clause of the
Commerce Clause. Finally, we'll discuss something about the po-
sitions which various parties who are interested in the project
take, and to what extent those positions can remain flexible or
will harden because of financial or environmental considerations.
Professor Lutz has certainly raised a broad range of issues that
we have to deal with, and my comment after his presentation is
that he has left us only with a sense of hopelessness that no one
could ever address all those issues or make any kind of coherent
decision that takes them all into consideration. But that doesn't
mean that we shouldn't raise them. The parties who are present
today have a great deal of experience and interest, particularly in
the area of liquefied natural gas as an energy source. Conse-
quently, our discussion will naturally focus around that area.
However, the discussion should not necessarily be limited to that,
unless the participants feel they are unable or unwilling to ven-
ture outside that area. I would also say, of course, that a lot of
the discussion which has gone on around liquefied natural gas in
California centers around WLNG's plan to build a terminal and
the subsequent decisions which have been made to place that ter-
minal at Little Cojo Bay, near Point Conception. It's not our pur-
pose as a panel to retry the Point Conception case. That's been
extensively discussed at the regulatory and judicial levels. We
don't have the capability of retrying it, nor is it in our best inter-
ests to do so. The extent to which the panelists wish to draw
upon it as an experience can be very valuable, but it won't be our
purpose to redecide whether or not any particular decision or the
decisions as a whole were right, wrong, or indifferent.
We have a fairly diverse group of people representing a number
of different interests and perspectives on the problems relating to
energy development and the process involved. Let me begin this
panel discussion by directing a question to Mr. McKinney. I'd
like to ask why we are pointing toward LNG as an energy source;
where does it fit into our choices regarding energy sources with
alternatives such as coal, oil, nuclear, and solar energy? I'd ask
him also to comment, to the extent he wishes to do so, upon the
positions of WLNG, with regard to the benefits and problems in-
volved in using LNG as an energy source. Mr. McKinney.
MeKinney: I will now proceed to take the remaining time to re-
spond to that question.
Moderator: That relieves me of a burden for sure.
McKinney: I think there are a couple reasons why LNG fits into
the energy picture of California and the United States. First, Cali-
fornia in particular is highly dependent on natural gas. It pro-
vides fifty-percent of the energy not used for transportation in the
State. The bulk of the remaining fifty percent, of course, is made
up of oil, principally imported oil.
The distribution system used to deliver the natural gas is a tre-
mendous system. In California, there are approximately 70,000
miles of underground pipeline in place as a fixed delivery system,
an extremely valuable asset. Since 1968, the production of domes-
tic reserves has exceeded the new discoveries of domestic gas
supplies; so, consequently, our domestic gas base has been dwin-
dling rather rapidly. Conservation has helped offset the rate of
that decline a bit, but every year we consume more gas than we
produce.
I think that in the long-term, within the next twenty to fifty
years, we are looking at the prospect of coal being a major source
of synthetic gas which will employ the same delivery system. In
the interim, we have the question of how to hold the system to-
gether. Liquefied natural gas appears to be one of the ways in
which it can be done. Coal gasification is extremely expensive,
the technology is still emerging, and the national will to mine that
much coal isn't yet present, but it will come, I think, with time. In
the meantime, there are astounding amounts of gas abroad that
can be made available to the United States in the form of LNG.
We're particularly fortunate to be in the Pacific Basin where gas
supplies exist around the Basin.
A second reason why LNG fits into the energy picture of Cali-
fornia and the United States is that in the state of Alaska there
are prospects for great amounts of gas supplies, some of which
[Vol. 9:1,1981] Energy in the Eighties
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
will be transportable by pipeline, just as the North Slope gas will
hopefully be someday. Other supplies exist in areas where it is
physically impossible to construct pipelines to move the gas out.
It appears that LNG technology is the only solution for making
that gas available to the consuming lower forty-eight states.
As to the problems, earlier we heard about the decade of the
Seventies, the environmental changes, the changing course of
laws during that period of time, and, I would say, the changing
course of political and regulatory practice. That decade was also
the decade of selecting sites and getting permits to site an LNG
facility in California. Our greatest difficulty in dealing with the
situation has changed along the way from being a technical prob-
lem to a political one. That decade saw changes in law. The Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, just coming into being at the be-
ginning of the decade, was interpreted diversely during the
decade. The regulatory agencies changed their practices in deal-
ing with it during the decade, always to the extent of being more
rigorous. The Coastal Zone Act, which came into being during
that decade, took our planning for three sites, which we held, into
a new political environmental process. Furthermore, administra-
tion and agency people have changed. We've gone through
changes not only of laws, but of attitudes with the personnel. So
these changes must be considered in trying to bring a project into
being which is as complex and has as many issues as a major en-
ergy facility, and I wouldn't restrict this to LNG. I think the only
unique thing about us in following the process to its conclusion,
which we will do, is that we have a public utility trust, an obliga-
tion, to PG&E in the north and to Pacific Lighting for Southern
California Gas Company in the south. Incidentally, Pacific Light-
ing is not the parent of PG&E. They're an unaffiliated corporation
entering into a partnership for LNG purposes only.
There was Dow Chemical, although not an energy processor
which was certainly a controversial type of operation. Then there
was Sohio, which was an energy transmission system. Both of
these were the kinds of ventures that owed no particular loyalty
to the state of California. When they began to wade into the mo-
rass of obtaining a permit, they simply pulled up and went else-
where. We do not have that luxury, or I assure you we would
have done that a long time ago. There are other places in the
United States where one could build a terminal rather quickly,
despite the same laws being in place.
We're not unique, but we have been through a long and rigor-
ous ordeal. Even the parties appearing on the other side of the
table from us have changed. Our first choice was for our domestic
project, South Alaska Gas, to come to Los Angeles Harbor on the
seaward side of Terminal Alaska Gas. Our second terminal loca-
tion selected was Ormond Beach in the city of Oxnard. Our third
choice was the one that is now our only choice, Little Cojo Bay
near Point Conception, which we, as a result of all our site selec-
tion efforts, arrived at as a third choice for a major project. At the
same time, but quite independently, El Paso Natural Gas Com-
pany, had done precisely the same thing, and we inherited their
interest in the facility at that location.
Each of the locations had opponents of a provincial base. The
people who are well represented on the panel today, the Bixby
Ranch and the Hollister Ranch owners, and the Santa Barbara In-
dian Center, would not be across the table from us today if it had
not been for the legislative edict in California that there would be
a land use conflict requiring the first terminal to be remote. The
definition of "remote" was such that neither the Terminal Island
site nor the Oxnard site qualified under the State Act.
I don't want to take up too much time on this, but another com-
plication is that we are faced with two processes at the same time,
a state process and a federal process. I think people have largely
forgotten that we have a valid certificate from the Department of
Energy to build an LNG terminal at the Oxnard site. However,
the Department of Energy decision makers, as they saw the legis-
lation develop in California, chose not to go the federal
supremacy route, but rather tried to accommodate the California
interest. They also allowed us to make application for the Little
Cojo site. And as you know, they rendered a favorable decision
on that site as well. The latter decision is not final yet; the one as
to the Oxnard site is. So we have a multifaceted situation. I think
I heard six dimensions this morning, and that's about right.
I think you particularly had in mind the issue of safety. Safety
has been addressed at great lengths in two different ways. One is
through the regulatory forum, via the technical, scientific, and evi-
dentiary way. That method led to a finding by the Department of
Energy that public safety would be adequately protected with an
LNG facility in the Oxnard area. Secondly, the State Legislature
viewed safety in a political light, not in a technical light, and sim-
ply chose to make the question moot by requiring a remote loca-
tion. It didn't make it as moot as perhaps the Legislature thought
it would, but it did remove the terminal and the concentration of
energy from population concentrations.
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In the regulatory field, the question of safety was addressed in
California under the statute requiring the PUC to address it.
Such consideration included what the design should be at the site
and what we should be required to comply with. The approach
taken was unlike natural gas pipelines, where location is a factor
and population density is taken into account in design, so that in
remote areas, the design requirements are less rigorous. Higher
pressures are allowed there than in a populated area for the same
design. That is not the case with the LNG terminal. The require-
ments on the terminal design are the same as though we were
building it on a parcel of the same size in the city of Los Angeles.
That's another measure of safety and the way it's been addressed.
Moderator: Are there other comments that anyone would like
to make, particularly with regard to those remarks before we ask
another question? Mr. Liss?
Liss: Keith McKinney has listed all of the factors that he be-
lieves have accounted for the fact that the particular LNG applica-
tion at issue has been pending for so long; but, you know, I really
think that one he mentioned is absolutely the key here. It raises
questions about the legislature's role, state and federal, but espe-
cially in this case the State's role in regulating an energy facility
siting while the process is going on. I don't think there's any
doubt but that the key development in the delay, such as there
has been delay in this project, was the passage in 1977 of the Cali-
fornia LNG Terminal Siting Act, which mandated remote siting.
As Keith correctly points out, just before that Act was passed, the
federal government, at the administrative law level, had approved
the Oxnard site, a site that the federal government and just about
everyone involved, including the state of California in the federal
proceedings, said was the superior site. As Keith said, Point Con-
ception was the third choice of the three. So we had everyone
agreeing that Oxnard was the best site for this terminal. Then the
State passes an Act which under state law would exclude Oxnard
as a possible selection. I don't know how the utilities felt about
this Act, although Keith has said in the federal proceeding that
they acquiesced or supported the California Act in exchange for
other considerations, specifically the fast-track aspect of it all. All
things considered, I don't know whether the utility companies
would rather have had it or not.
In any case, that changed the whole ball game, because then
the best site from the state's standpoint was taken away. Inciden-
tally, as Keith mentioned, at the administrative level, that is the
final agency level, Oxnard was then approved by the federal gov-
ernment three months after the passage of the State Act. But
now, instead of building in Oxnard which may have been the
likely result if there had been no LNG Terminal Act or if it had
been resisted, despite passage, by the sponsoring company, you
have a whole new proceeding where all the questions have not
been sorted out yet.
One likely claim that could be made at the federal level, and it
was certainly made by my client and others at the administrative
level, is that the federal government ought to override the state's
statute as a matter of preemption and select the best site, which
is Oxnard. That question hasn't been sorted out yet, and God
only knows when it will be.
I don't know whether the California Legislature could have an-
ticipated this, but I think the key factor in the development of this
project was the passage in 1977 of that Act with the deliberate in-
tent to affect the site selection and final decision in that case.
There was no real pretense to that being an act of general applica-
tion. It was directed at that case. It tried to mandate a result, and
it's unclear now whether in so doing it may have doomed the pro-
ject. Whether the state will ultimately get the result it was after,
or whether the state will even continue to support that result, re-
mains to be seen. It's already been more than three years, and by
the time it's decided, it may be many more years still. I think it
has raised very serious questions about whether a legislature can
ever anticipate what's going to happen when it starts to tinker
with individual cases.
I've been expecting an elbow from Lionel here and haven't got-
ten it yet, but I'd be curious to hear what he's got to say about
that.
Wilson: I rather disagree with you. I think that the Act itself
has not been the-well, it has been the key factor in delay. I
think it's been a detour. My own personal view is that the reason
the project hasn't gotten off the ground is that there is no positive
energy policy, in California or at a national level, which ade-
quately addresses the relative roles of LNG and gas in relation to
synthetic fuels, coal, conservation, and whatnot. I think that if
there had been a policy in place and some kind of strong guide-
lines at the time the California Act was passed by the State Legis-
lature, the federal government would have overridden California
if they felt it was in the best interest of the nation to go forward
with an Oxnard site.
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I think that's true here in California. I believe that if California
had some type of energy policy that clearly spelled out the rela-
tive roles in the future, we probably would have seen a decision
on LNG by today. As a supplement to that, the decision on July
31, 1978, which conditionally permitted the Point Conception site,
was an attempt to say "we don't like the idea of coal in California.
We think gas can play the major role in California." Gas would be
what we look to as a transition twenty years down the road.
Finally, let me say that, certainly from the point of view of
Keith McKinney, the experience of getting the project off the
ground has been a frustrating one. Certainly, from the viewpoint
of the public and the California Public Utilities Commission,
three years have elapsed since WLNG first filed its application,
and it looks like we're bungling along, and to some extent we
have. However, the truth of the matter is, from my point of view,
the California consumer has benefited from the delay, although
not necessarily from the cost. Everybody can talk about the cost,
but nevertheless we are now able to focus upon the lapse of three
years and predict a little more clearly what's going to happen in
the future. For example, what is the proper role of LNG, and
what is the need for LNG?
Moderator: I gather you don't have a sense that anyone is mak-
ing an overall decision as to where these pieces fit together.
Rather, your time is being occupied in what are essentially tech-
nological aspects of the problem without having a sense of where
this all goes.
For instance, Mr. McKinney mentioned that he sees gasification
of coal, and synthetic fuel, as long-range major energy sources
and sees LNG as necessary in the interim period. Now, where are
those decisions being made? Are they being made simply by pri-
vate industry? To the extent those choices are being made at one
place or another, how adequate are the considerations such as
cost effectiveness, safety, and cleanliness being coordinated as we
move toward the production of LNG? Anyone want to tackle that
one?
Knierim: I think you've hit on one of the interesting and per-
haps unique aspects of things like LNG terminals. This is be-
cause, like any other kind of environmental issue which involves
a large scale land use that is worth a lot of money to some, the
decisions are not made. I can say this, not as an energy expert,
but as a land use lawyer normally dealing with residential and
light industrial developments. I became involved in this problem
from the perspective of someone challenging a political land use
decision, rather than from the perspective of someone dealing
with energy. Whether you're talking about going to a city council
and deciding if 100 acres of what used to be open grassland on the
edge of town are going to become a residential division, or
whether a particular open space of grassland on the edge of Cali-
fornia is going to become an LNG terminal, they are essentially
the same questions.
The fundamental decision is a political one, and it's reached by
compromise. There's some very interesting background to the
LNG Terminal Act which helps put this in perspective. The fed-
eral government did approve Oxnard. It's very clear to all of us
on the panel that the federal government has the authority to pre-
empt local government or state government if an improved energy
facility is found necessary for the national interest.
Despite that, the gas companies involved were going forward
through the local government administrative process in Oxnard
and through the myriad of convoluted requirements from various
state agencies. They were trying to get all the permits they would
need, as would any ordinary person who was trying to build any-
thing that required land use approvals, without overriding federal
approval. And they were running into great difficulties. They
were having trouble with Oxnard, the Department of Fish and
Game, the Coastal Commission, and probably the twenty or thirty
agencies that were involved.
The gas companies went to the legislature and said: "Why don't
you preempt all of the state and local government approvals, ex-
pedite the process, and put it in one place?" That was done.
However, in exchange for that, there was a substantial body of
sentiment in the Legislature that felt the terminal was terribly
dangerous, and that, as a matter of general overriding policy, it
had to be remotely sited. This was not a unilateral dictate by the
Legislature. It was something to which Mr. McKinney's compa-
nies agreed in exchange for the expedited permit process. As an
interesting aside, I know that because I have met the gentleman
who drafted the LNG Terminal Act. He works for Mr. McKinney
in the legal department.
Aside from that, the gas company was in a position where they
had to say: "Look, remote siting is wonderful perhaps. There is
only one place we can go with it. We're years down the pike;
we've put a lot of money into Los Angeles; we've put a lot of
money into Oxnard; and we've kind of looked at Point Concep-
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tion. The Act is drafted in such a way that it really mandates the
selection of one particular site." Two of Mr. Wilson's commission-
ers concurring in the July 31, 1978 approval of Point Conception
said: "It's really too bad. It isn't a great site, but the Act is a
stacked deck. The gas company didn't have any place else to go,
and all we can do is approve Point Conception."
The Act has had some very interesting implications on the pro-
cess because we've basically gone through the process, to a large
extent, knowing what the outcome was going to be. You can spec-
ulate for yourselves on what that does to the role of lawyers and
others involved in what, on paper, is intended to be a totally im-
partial adjudicatory proceeding. I don't mean to condemn this as
a particular and unusual example of that. It is again, a conse-
quence of the fact that you're dealing with a 500 million dollar
project. Those are very, very important bucks in anybody's lan-
guage. You could be dealing with a ten million dollar project on a
local government level. That's important enough that everyone
gets involved, everyone cares, and everyone wants to make the
decisions in whatever way they can. This includes the political
people, legislators, councilmen, governor, and whoever else is ex-
posed. They not only have an interest in its legitimacy, but also
are probably in a position where they don't have any choice but to
have an interest in it.
MeKinney: I wonder if I might just say one little thing because
I don't want to take credit for our people drafting the Terminal
Siting Act of 1977. The process developed in the Legislature, and
in the Assembly, where, for whatever reason, an assemblyman
heading up a vital subcommittee introduced legislation which
would have required that the first terminal in California not be lo-
cated on the mainland at all. In our judgment, and the judgment
of other experts, that would have been beyond our technical capa-
bility to comply with. So, in effect, it would have precluded our
bringing in these gas supplies.
In response to that, we, organized labor, business leaders, and
other leaders in the Legislature, discussed the problem and a La-
bor Bill, definitely not the Bill that was enacted, was introduced
in the Senate. It was SB 1081.
That Bill was passed in the Senate and it did not mandate a re-
mote site. The result came about in the compromise which took
place in the Assembly. The offshore site was compromised to a
remote onshore site, and so it came out of that political process.
Believe me, I fought very hard to preserve the Oxnard site. When
it became apparent that it was politically impossible, I said the
practical effect, in my judgment, was that, if there was going to be
a site, it would have to be the Little Cojo site. As long as they
were going to mandate it, they might as well go ahead and man-
date it and end the whole problem. They wouldn't do that either.
It was not a process we controlled by any stretch of the imagi-
nation. But, it did salvage at least the ability to get a permit in
California, which the Legislature might have, without some oppo-
sition to what was going on, prohibited for political reasons,
rather than technical reasons.
Wilson: Keith, I had always thought that the Act itself was re-
ally a compromise type of thing; one in which Southern California
Gas, Pacific Lighting, and PG&E took a realistic view of the possi-
bility of siting a terminal at Oxnard, the problems of going
through the different California agencies and the Court of Ap-
peals, and what that would do to your gas producers in Alaska
and the Indonesian Government. On the other hand, you had the
squeeze coming for the remote site and said: "Okay, this is the
deal: we'll go to the PUC. We can get quick Supreme Court re-
view if we go to the PUC one-stop siting process, and we'll agree
to go to Little Cojo Bay in a short form." Is that not correct?
McKinney: Well, there are certainly elements of correctness in
it. The question of remote onshore siting was one decided upon
by the Assembly leaders without any concurrence from us. We
were advised that if there were to be a Bill, remote onshore siting
would be in the Bill, and if we wanted to follow the direction of
the Bill we could. But, if we didn't want to, we'd be out of the pic-
ture-so political realities came to life. There was no other way
for us to come out of that process with legislation which would
clean up the permitting morass in California.
I think everybody would agree that no major facility has been
sited in California since the Coastal Commission has come into
play. That may be in part because there haven't been that many
of them willing to run the gauntlet; I don't know. But, the polit-
ical realities are what they are; and I've learned much more about
the political process during this selection process than I ever
hoped to know. The art of compromise is not one that comes eas-
ily to the understanding of an engineer. It's either right or it's not
right. In the Legislature there's a lot of mixing, and it was, in fact,
a political decision, and not one I can take much credit for.
Baird: I've got one comment about the Act. The Coastal Coin-
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mission was given the role of ranking and evaluating the various
potential LNG sites on'the coast based on their relative merit and
their compatibility with Coastal Act policies. We started out with
eighty-two sites and through a very long process narrowed it
down to five sites, which eventually were narrowed down to four
final sites. I think the biggest constraint and the biggest thing
that's being implied here is the fact that we had to rank Point
Conception in our ranking. If we had applied the criteria that we
had applied to all of the other sites in this process, Point Concep-
tion would have been knocked out, as was the Los Varas site in
the latter part of our process. Even though we could not knock it
out, we went ahead and ranked Point Conception with the various
other sites that we had at the end of the process.
I think our greatest concern at that point was that, with Point
Conception still being evaluated, the three other sites that the
Coastal Commission had ranked were eliminated from the pro-
cess completely, which left only Point Conception as a site. There
was no longer another alternative left.
Also, with the compromise on the offshore site, the Coastal
Commission did an offshore LNG terminal siting study which cost
1.2 million dollars to conduct, but there is no provision in Senate
Bill 1081 for precluding offshore siting. The offshore site is strictly
being looked at for a second terminal. I seriously question
whether the Legislature ever anticipated a second LNG terminal
along the coast of California when you see all the problems that
have come into play with just this one terminal. So, our biggest
problem was that these three other sites were not left in for some
further consideration.
We felt that the Camp Pendleton site was the best site in terms
of our Coastal Act policies. I think offshore siting has so many ad-
vantages compared to any sites on shore. You don't have the land
use problems with the construction, the archeological problems,
the military conflicts, and the visual problems are not nearly as
severe. In terms of seismic problems, the facility which we found
to be the most appropriate offshore was a floating facility which is
not connected directly with the ocean floor through a hard con-
nection. It is a single point mooring system. Marine resources
and other things which are protected by the Coastal Act are not
affected with the same impact from this type of facility.
So getting back to the process itself, I think we should have left
everything open after the PUC decision and continued to look at
the possibility of offshore siting and the possibility of some of
these other sites. If Point Conception is, in the final round of
these proceedings, eliminated because of seismic problems, there
would be no LNG alternative, which I think is very restrictive of
the process.
Wilson: I want to respond, not to defend the PUC, but rather to
express one of the interesting things that happened from our
point of view. Although I'm not sure the Coastal Commission
would take the same stance today, I'm referring to their exclusion
of the Los Varas site. WLNG probably breathed a sigh of relief
when that happened. However, under the 1977 Terminal Act, it
would have been very difficult for the PUC to decide on the Point
Conception site if Los Varas had been ranked. I know everyone
says that it was mandated to go to Point Conception. But legally
speaking, and with court review, I think it would have been diffi-
cult under the Statute and on the basis by which the PUC could
eliminate the higher ranked sites, to get around the Los Varas
site. That would have created its own political problems: the Uni-
versity of California at Santa Barbara, the City of Santa Barbara,
and whatnot. I have a feeling that if the PUC hadn't selected that
site, the Court would have told us to go back because our stan-
dards and the way in which we eliminated the other sites were
improper under the Act itself.
Baird: Thus, you feel the three additional sites had to be elimi-
nated once the PUC picked Point Conception?
Wilson: Well, that's a technical argument. I don't know why,
and this isn't in defense of the PUC, but there was no way, if you
thought you needed an LNG terminal, that we were going to go to
Camp Pendleton and fight the battles with the Marine Corps and
the Navy. The Coastal Commission had received a letter from the
Secretary of the Navy telling them to forget it. The Coastal Com-
mission also had received letters from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission telling them to forget the Rattlesnake Canyon site
and to some extent the Camp Pendleton site, although that wasn't
as extensive of a problem.
There were other problems with respect to Rattlesnake Canyon
and those types of things. If you're looking to safety considera-
tions and a balancing approach, I believe that of all the sites car-
ried over, Point Conception turned out to be the best site. From
an environmental point of view and from a safety point of view,
Point Conception is the best site. That's my personal viewpoint
on that.
Knierim: This illustrates the political nature of this because
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there's probably a lot of self-defending that can be done. There
was a very interesting thing that happened about the site ranking,
and perhaps it would be useful to give a little background. The
Coastal Commission went through, as Brian said, about eighty-
two sites and came out with a final list and put them in order of
preference on various environmental and other criteria.
The LNG Terminal Act told the PUC it had to pick the highest
ranked sites, unless it found that there was going to be a delay in
the providing of gas to high priority gas users in California by go-
ing to that site. If such was the case, the selection of the next
lowest ranked site would be proper, if it substantially minimized
that delay.
A high priority gas user is someone like you and I who uses gas
to heat their homes or certain kinds of businesses. The low prior-
ity gas user, what the PUC calls Category 5, is a person who uses
natural gas in boilers to generate electricity. That is the only
thing we tend to be using natural gas for in California at the mo-
ment. We've got enough energy from other sources to cover the
high priority uses.
The other thing that we found particularly amusing was that
the PUC had to go three times through the process of saying:
"This one's going to take too long; the next one will be faster,"
before they could get to Point Conception, and that process was
based on the assumption that by now we'd already be building
the terminal. Meanwhile, we were ourselves standing there and
saying: "You're not going to be doing that because we're all going
to be tied up in litigation this long."
It was in a sense an exercise in saying: "We're going to select
Point Conception since we've already made the decision that
that's where it's going to go." I have a great deal of sympathy for
Mr. McKinney's company in one sense because you're going to
ask yourself: "Well, gee, why didn't they simply go to the federal
government and have them preempt the state's decision to throw
out Oxnard?" The federal government could certainly do that, but
it would have resulted in litigation, of course, and would have
been quite a problem. There's a very simple answer to it. One of
Mr. McKinney's people mentioned it to us out in the hall at a
PUC hearing. We have to do business in California. Mr. McKin-
ney represents a California based utility that looks to Lionel's
Commission to set its rates and let it recover money. It's in no
position, no matter what it thinks, to back out of the local political
decision. It's a very difficult decision for everyone to be in.
Moderator: I gather that one of the things that I'm hearing in
answer to my specific question is that there's no one calling the
shots. There's really no one helping WLNG. There's no one say-
ing to us: "Look, we need WLNG. Here's where it fits into our en-
ergy policy. Because we do need it, and because we've assessed
what its importance is, and the risk versus the cost benefits ver-
sus the need for it, we're going to assist you in facilitating the pro-
cess." Nor has anyone else's role been clearly defined in
assessing those issues either. We're dealing with technical
aspects.
Let me move on then to a question which evolves from that.
Really, I have two questions that evolve from it. The first one
would be, drawing on your experience with Point Conception, and
since you have a six dimensional process here, with which you
only have two hands to deal with, where should this be decided?
You represent a multitude of interests. We can make an argu-
ment that from a national security standpoint, even from a na-
tional economic standpoint, we must have energy sources. It has
been mentioned here that from California's standpoint LNG is a
more desirable energy source than coal because we're a "have"
state, not a "have not." The state obviously has environmental
concerns, and those need to be considered. We also have federal
environmental concerns in offshore sites.
Really, where should the allocation be? Who really ought to de-
cide this problem? Should it be the federal government? If so,
should it be the Congress which decides it? Should it be the De-
partment of Energy which decides it? To what extent should the
state, the Coastal Commission, and the PUC have an input into
this process in order to facilitate an energy policy, whether we
have an articulated one or simply feel a need for energy.
McKinney: Could I ask a question before that gets answered?
You've mentioned twice that we're a "have" state, and I'm not
sure what you mean.
Moderator: I meant with regard to gas as opposed, say, to coal
or something.
McKinney: No, we're not. We're quite a "have not" state in
terms of everything but high sulphur fuel oil. Most of the gas,
practically all the gas, that is consumed in California today is im-
ported. It's imported from the Southwestern United States, Texas
principally. Furthermore, Northern California is fairly heavily re-
liant on Canadian gas. Most low sulphur oil that principally fuels
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the boilers and industrial consumers in California is foreign oil.
So we're a highly energy-deficient state.
Moderator: Okay. I think that's true, and I guess one of the
things I'm thinking of Mr. McKinney, more than anything else, is
that we have perhaps a better capability for importation into our
state than, say, do the midwestern states or others.
McKinney: Of LNG?
Moderator: Yes, of LNG. You mentioned that as one of the
more feasible choices simply because we do have the capability of
introducing it through shipping.
Now, with those clarifications, let's...
Knierim: Well, at the risk of seeming fiesty, I'd like to make
one point about Mr. McKinney's clarification. We have a lot of gas
in California that could be taken out of the ground that isn't. One
of the intervening parties opposed to this is the California Gas
Producers Association, who make the point that there are vast
quantities of natural gas tied up under contracts with PG&E Com-
pany, which is one of the two partners in Mr. McKinney's
organization.
There are years when those contracts allow PG&E to restrict
taking gas out of the ground to ninety days out of the year.
They've got a tremendous incentive, since that guarantees a long-
term supply. Also, the way that utilities get compensated for pro-
viding gas is that it gets a set rate of return on what's called the
rate base. In other words, how much money they've spent. It
gives them, among other things, an incentive to spend a lot of
money and put expensive things like LNG terminals into the rate
base, instead of cheap things like gas wells on regular land in Cal-
ifornia, because the more they load in, the more they make.
Clarke: If only that were true. If only that were true.
Island: I think that you've probably surmised a very highly
opinionated point of view that we dispute. First of all, I think it is
a matter of very clear record that there are not substantial quanti-
ties of gas in Northern California going unproduced that would in
any way approach meeting the needs of the California gas con-
sumers. Those contracts are a matter of public record. They've
been debated; they've been litigated. To the best of my recollec-
tion, that process has gone all the way to the California Supreme
Court, or near there, and its been approved.
However, I think the significant statistic you're looking at here
is nine hundred million cubic feet of gas per day, a very substan-
tial quantity. We don't have volumes like that in the ground
which are going unproduced. I'd like to address the question
you've asked, which goes to the very heart of this Symposium to-
day: Who should decide the very difficult questions that are in-
herent in WLNG's proposal?
I've been working with this one project almost exclusively for
about nine years, and my effort in this project leads me to con-
clude that the decisions are being made in the right places, but
much too slowly. I think the State of California or any other state
which is host to a major energy facility certainly has a role to play
in deciding the whole question of whether or not it's needed and
if it's aimed at serving residents of that state. It's a policy that
stems from something you're very familiar with, and that is the
inherent police powers of the state. California has sought, albeit
very late, to assert its concept of land use planning and, to some
extent, natural gas energy policy through the LNG Terminal Act
of 1977.
By the way, if you'd like to bore yourselves some Saturday, I
think it's found at about section 5550 of the Public Utilities Code.
Through that Act, the State sought to say: "This is our point of
view on a large energy facility like this, the siting aspects of it,
and the general question of need for the supply." We accept that
because we do business here. We intend to stay in business in
California and to undertake our role as a public utility, which I
think Mr. McKinney alluded to as somewhat unique, because it's
a role that a party may not abandon without permission. It's a
concept somewhat strange in the American capitalistic system.
Once you undertake the public utility obligation, you cannot
thereafter walk away at your convenience. You've got to seek
approval.
So, we intend to continue to undertake that obligation. It just
makes good sense that the State should have something to say
about land use planning and about siting a facility the size of an
LNG terminal on its coast. We've accepted that. I personally
don't think my client has been a victim of that. I think we've been
a beneficiary of it. The policy decision came late, that's true.
We'd rather have had it in 1965 than in 1977. What we had to do
when we got the late decision was to commence the legal and reg-
ulatory procedures specifically required by the Act to receive
approval.
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With regard to the federal approvals that are required, you may
not know, and I'll just take a minute if I might, Professor, and give
you a very broad one and one-half minute lecture on the federal
aspects of this case. The Natural Gas Act, which can be found at
15 U.S.C. section 717, envisioned a scheme for approval of the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce. Through a
series of administrative decisions, it's now established that LNG
is natural gas that comes within the Act's regulations and man-
dates. Therefore, the Federal Power Commission had jurisdiction
to regulate LNG under section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act.
The original application by WLNG was filed with the then Fed-
eral Power Commission. We sought approval, under section 7(c),
to construct and operate three terminals on the coast of Califor-
nia: in Los Angeles Harbor, Oxnard, and Point Conception. At
that time, WLNG's application envisioned a rather unique pro-
cess. We confronted the federal decision makers with a land use
planning concept. That is, we said: "We've identified three sites
through an extensive site selection process. We would like to get
approval now of the acceptability of those sites. As projects are
put together to bring LNG into California, it would be designated
to go through one of those sites."
As you can imagine, the Federal Power Commission was per-
haps astounded by that concept. The Commission did not want to
embark on that kind of process, and they cited some very techni-
cal reasons in support of their position. They said: "We don't
think that at the end of any proceeding we could have on that
concept we would have enough data to issue permits under the
Natural Gas Act." So we were forced to await the filing of specific
projects for each site. That was under section seven of the Natu-
ral Gas Act.
Also, something happened that hasn't been mentioned here,
and I think it's very important. The importation approval author-
ity in section three of the Natural Gas Act was taken from the
Federal Power Commission. The Federal Power Commission it-
self was extinguished and its section three import responsibilities
given to an independent regulatory authority within the Depart-
ment of Energy. That authority, contained in section three of the
Natural Gas Act, was then transferred to the Economic Regula-
tory Administration.
We had applications pending at that time with the FPC. So,
when the Department of Energy Organization Act became effec-
tive, WLNG's application for the Oxnard site was then transferred
to the Economic Regulatory Commission for decision. That was a
further complication which the project had to deal with and ac-
commodate. In effect, this transfer had its own impact on the tim-
ing of the approvals.
We have accepted regulation. In fact, my client and I think
most utilities are quite comfortable with the concept of being reg-
ulated, and we've been that way ever since the Public Utilities
Code was first enacted in California. We don't run from it; we
don't fear it. We have learned to accept the fundamental position
that the state and the federal governments have a role to play in
energy decisions that affect large segments of the population. We
don't have a problem with that. We have not tried to avoid it. In
fact, I think Mr. Liss can tell you, we have enthusiastically sought
regulation of all aspects of our LNG project.
If I'm to answer the question, and I'll stop because I hear a few
sighs, whether or not decisions are being made in the right places,
my answer would be yes; they are being made in the right places:
the federal and state governments. The problem is, it takes so
long to make the decision that it has an adverse impact on the
project costwise.
Moderator: Mr. Liss?
Clarke: I'd like to make a comment to follow up, if I may. Two
points are being made. One, I think it is merely a general feeling
that LNG is necessary. I'd like to clarify that. The necessity of
LNG was the subject of extensive hearings before the PUC, and a
direct determination was made as to the need for the LNG sup-
plies in California and the role that LNG was supposed to play in
California's future. It has also been the subject of extensive hear-
ings at the federal level. In adjudicatory proceedings, after the
presentation and cross-examination of witnesses, thousands of
pages of testimony, and hundreds of pages of exhibits, it was de-
termined that LNG should and must play a determinative role in
the decades ahead to meet this nation's energy needs. Both the
state and federal governments have officially said that. So, in
case any of you have the idea that the gas supply problem is just
kind of a gossamery cloud that happens to go between us and the
sun now and then, it's not. It's a very real problem, and very real
determinations have been made.
The second thing I'd like to clarify is the concept that somehow
a utility earns and earns and earns. That is simply not correct.
We have recently filed a rate reduction of 128 million dollars
before the PUC for the very fact that sales during the period ex-
ceeded those anticipated, upon which we were authorized to col-
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lect our fair cost of doing business. The result is that we are
refunding that to our customers, and there will be another refund
in February because of a flow through of certain producer refunds
at the federal level. We are not guaranteed a rate of return in any
way, shape, or form. If we overcollect, we have to refund the ex-
cess, and that is solely related to our cost of gas. All other costs
are hopefully recovered in the rate of return. We are not guaran-
teed those costs at all. It is hoped for and is a target which we
have never been successful in attaining.
Now, as far as the issue of earnings is concerned, it's not the
simple matter of just selling gas and earning and earning and
earning as much as you can if you sell more than you anticipate.
Moreover, since we're dealing with a federally regulated entity,
it's going to be nearly impossible for a facility which is designed
to deliver 940 mmcf a day to get any more than that through the
facility in order to play around with volumes and sales. You're
pretty well restricted just by the physical limitation of getting the
gas all the way from Indonesia.
Increasingly, even at the federal level, there's been a recogni-
tion that the excess collections of cost should be refunded in sub-
sequent rate adjustments. Consequently, there is no hope that
we are ever going to earn anything in excess of what we're au-
thorized, and I would personally advise my client that there's lit-
tle chance of ever earning what is authorized. Thank you.
Moderator: Mr. Liss, you had a point a minute ago about the
federal and state ....
Liss: I was about to respond to Eddie's point, but now I feel
like I'm in a tag team match. In light of what Tom Clarke and Ed-
die Island just said, I really only have two reflections on the pro-
cess as it's applied to this case.
I agree with much of what Eddie has said about the state and
federal processes; obviously, both must play a role. I think the
constant cry of, "delay, delay, delay," misses the mark in many re-
spects. However, Eddie's example of the switch in jurisdiction
over natural gas imports from the new FERC to the Economic
Regulatory Administration in the Department of Energy was
rather insignificant in the progress of this case.
I don't want to defend or attack that statutory set up, but I don't
think it played much of a role in the delay. There was a joint
hearing in the federal proceedings for the 'Economic Regulatory
Administration and the FERC. It took place at the FERC. The
FERC played the lead role there, and in fact, on the siting ques-
tion, the Economic Regulatory Administration basically deferred
to the FERC. I don't think that was a delay factor at all. I believe
that utilities have to recognize, and that they do recognize behind
closed doors, that much of the delay is due to the fact that these
are terribly complex projects, that problems arise, and that the
problems have to be aired if an intelligent decision is going to be
made. Look, for example, at this case. There is this discussion
about the years of delay, and I think it's fair to start the clock
from the time California passed the LNG Terminal Act. The de-
lay may have been far less, but for a completely unforeseen devel-
opment that had to be taken into account. In April of 1978, a
geologist for the Hollister Ranch Owners Association walked on
the site and found a very serious earthquake fault. That started a
chain of events that you've all read about in the papers, producing
a massive amount of evidence, a very complex proceeding, and an
assessment, which the parties are still fighting about, as to
whether or not this is a seismically suitable site.
Now that was something that simply couldn't have been antici-
pated, and yet, I would hope that the applicants would not be sug-
gesting that's something we shouldn't be looking at. It's a delay
that wasn't built in, but it's delay for a good reason, mainly to
take a look at a very serious question here.
With respect to the need question, again, in Tom Clarke's asser-
tion that it's all taken care of, it is true that the federal govern-
ment has made a finding that this LNG is needed. Certainly it
hasn't been our position that LNG or the supplies represented
would never be needed in any circumstance in the future of Cali-
fornia. However, the critical question is whether it's needed in
the time frame which it's proposed for, and if not, doesn't that
mean that we have some time to look at some alternatives that
would be less offensive than the Point Conception LNG alterna-
tive appears to be to so many groups.
In that regard, the findings on need in the federal record were
made on the basis of supply and demand forecasts, made and
supplied by the applicant companies in 1977. It's no one's fault,
but supply and demand projections can change drastically over
the years. It's been Bixby's position, hotly disputed by the appli-
cants on the other side, that there has been a significant change,
and that change means that the supply and demand picture is
much better than was thought in 1977.
We're not saying that there's not a need for any more gas, but
what we're saying is there's time to look at less offensive alterna-
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tives that weren't known in 1977. Frankly, we think that the deci-
sion on supply and demand on the federal record is one of the
most vulnerable areas of the federal decision, simply because it
appears to us to be an outdated decision. So I don't think it's an
established fact that the LNG issue is needed in the time frame in
which it's proposed or ultimately will be needed at all.
Wilson: Let me just respond from state government's point of
view, and this is something that is going on now at the PUC. I
kind of agree with Eddie Island that the decisions are being made
in the right places.
When we were looking at the need for LNG in California and
wondering what its impact would be, we started looking at the
cost of LNG. Well, one of the considerations being pondered at
that time was, if California imports LNG at the rate of 900 million
cubic feet a day, will the federal government then require Califor-
nia to back off of cheaper gas coming from Texas and the South-
west? What will happen in the future if California does import
900 million cubic feet of gas? Will the federal government require
that we price that gas at the marginal cost of the importation or
could it be rolled into the other cost of gas being imported to Cali-
fornia? From California's point of view, it was important to know
what the "Feds" were going to do in reaching a decision.
At the same time, California was gazing into a crystal ball. The
one thing I was thinking about regarding this Symposium is that
we could deal effectively with the technological issue and the en-
vironmental issue. I feel we have dealt with them effectively, both
in terms of trying to mitigate them and in terms of the safety con-
siderations. Despite this, the real problem is crystal ball gazing
and getting involved in what we are going to do about energy in
California.
The terminal itself, for which the price of construction is up to
about a billion dollars, will probably end up costing, in inflated
dollars, over three billion dollars. This includes facilities in
Alaska, the shipping end of it, and the California terminal. This
will have a tremendous impact on California and on the California
consumer. Also included in this is the question of need. I agree
with Tom. The PUC did make a finding as to need, as did the fed-
eral government, but three years have elapsed. Not only is the
PUC now concerned about the cost of LNG in California, but to
some extent there are concerns about the impact upon our other
supplies. PG&E, for example, has taker-pay agreements with the
Canadian government. If they don't take the gas, they still have
to pay for it. If we bring LNG into California, PG&E may be re-
quired to back off of Canadian gas. These are considerations that
have to be dealt with.
There is some kind of need, I think, to look at where we are to-
day in light of the 1977 decision on the need for this gas supply,
i.e., at its cost. There are other considerations. How is this going
to be financed? Can the utilities finance this? The Commission
has under consideration and has implemented active conserva-
tion programs. There are only so many dollars in the pot.
Choices have to be made as to where those dollars are going to be
spent. The utilities themselves only have so many dollars. If
they're going to finance it, are they going to need some novel
financing mechanisms? If utilized, how would these mechanisms
impact the California rate payer?
It's just not a land use type of decision. The big decisions that
are being faced are not the environmental ones but rather are the
ones regarding need and economic consequences. These are deci-
sions we don't have any handle on, and I don't know how we can
get away from the mounting cost of these projects and reach
some kind of consensus as to how we should channel energy pol-
icy decision-making. One of my thoughts was there's a need to
put the regulator in the board room or the board room in with the
regulator. The problems with that, of course, are due process con-
siderations in the fairness of how you reach decisions, while al-
lowing citizen input. Those are some of the thoughts that I have
on the problem we are dealing with.
Island: I think I'd be somewhat remiss to my client if I didn't
go back and address, without intending to debate it here, the con-
cept that a very serious fault was found on that site. I feel this
concept has been resolved. What you heard was Mr. Liss's point
of view; my point of view is the extreme opposite of that.
The administrative processes that apply to this proposal are
grinding slowly to an ultimate decision. One of the steps along
the way has been the determination that the fault, which Mr. Liss
referred to, is not a significant one for the facilities that we're pro-
posing. I don't want to debate that extensively because those de-
cisions are on the record. You can go and look at them if you'd
like. I can give you a string of cites.
I think we're arriving at a very crucial aspect of the discussion.
Lionel mentioned one possible way to address these policy ques-
tions would be to put a regulator in the board room. I would sug-
gest that's the last thing we would want to do. The process, as it's
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structured now, provides for independent economic and public in-
terest decisions to be made by private enterprise. Namely, the
way this thing evolved was that Pacific Lighting sat down and
looked at its supply-demand data and determined that additional
gas supplies were required. They conducted the necessary eco-
nomic and engineering studies and got a handle on the cost and
answered the question of the engineering feasibility. We made
the decision to propose these projects. The way the public input
comes about, and I think it's the right way, is to have us fie the
proposal with a public agency that's charged with protecting the
public interest and then put on the public record all the details of
the project, from how the decision was made, to the cost and engi-
neering feasibility. We then provide a forum for a debate of the
broader public policy consideration. That was done.
I'd like to address one other thing that Jeff raised that I think is
a serious concern to people who practice before administrative
agencies and to the whole question of administrative law. You al-
ways have inherent in a process that takes years to come to a con-
clusion the question of the staleness of the record. That's also
true of any court case you try. You have to draw a line, make a
decision, based on the information and the data that has stood the
test of vigorous cross-examination and public scrutiny. On that
data and on that record you must come to a conclusion. That was
done in this case. The agencies looked at, our supply-demand
data. It was cross-examined extensively by Mr. Liss and the other
parties who opposed the site. As an interesting aid to those of
you who might someday practice either administrative litigation
or in the civil courts, I received from Mr. Liss a data request that
looked rather gentle and mild at first glance. I turned it over to
my client after my own legal analysis of it, indicating that the
data could be easily provided, and I recommended that it be
provided.
My client called me back and said, "Do you understand that
this is about five feet of data?"
I said, "No, I didn't understand that it was going to be that
much," but that was the result. We served, in response to their
data request, about five feet of data that focused on supply and
demand issues, and the whole subject was extensively cross-
examined.
The conclusion reached by the agency was that this gas is in-
deed needed. Now I think what Mr. Liss is asserting is that some
two and one-half years or so have now passed since that data was
put together. What do you do? I think the U.S. Supreme Court
provided a guideline in a case entitled Vermont v. Yankee. The
Supreme Court came to the conclusion that you do have some
question of staleness, but you have to reach a decision on an ad-
ministrative proceeding. You have to shut it off at some point in
time, and you have got to get on with doing whatever it is that's
being proposed, so you can continue looking out for the public
interest.
We are confident that the holding of Vermont v. Yankee is going
to provide the necessary umbrella to protect us from the assaults
planned by Mr. Liss and his client on this whole question of the
need for the project supply.
Moderator: Let me get to Mr. Knierim. He had asked a
question.
Knierim: I wrote your question down and thought that I would
actually try to provide a short answer to it. Not being an energy
lawyer, maybe I have again a different position. I think the deci-
sion is being made in the right place, several of them in the wrong
place, and several of them on too many levels. I think things like
this ought to be decided in the federal arena.
The reason is very simple. You have in the land use business
what's known as the "someone else's backyard" rule, which says,
if we need a military base, let's build one, but in someone else's
backyard. If we need an LNG terminal, let's build one, but not in
my backyard.
Assuming that we need an LNG terminal, which we dispute,
and if you ask any city on the coast in the United States, "Would
you like to serve the national interest and have an LNG terminal
with a big industrial facility and lots of ships coming back and
forth and make some of your beach industrialized instead of a
place for people to lie in the sun on?" They'll say, "No, put it on
their beach." You ask a city, "Would you like to have a low and
moderate income housing development?" They're needed, we all
agree with that. They'll respond, "It's inappropriate for the way
we grow trees in this municipality. Put it in their city." You have
this to some degree in California, which is not really a proper
place to look at something that is supposed to be a facility to
serve the energy needs of the country or contribute to a part of it.
The State is tying a certain kind of knot in my backyard rule or
only parts of my backyard, by asking, "Is this good for California?
What will happen to California?"
Well, we're not talking just about California. We're talking
about the country. We're talking about something that may or
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may not be good for the national interest generally. I think the
further you take a controversial decision away from the local
arena, where it is likely to have the heaviest impact, the more you
get it away from politics, and the more you increase the chances
of getting it into some kind of objective process where you might
actually have a decision made on the facts and the merits.
Moderator: Let me ask one other question, which I think will
provoke a lot of different people in different ways, and it's not
asked simply to provoke. Sohio, when it was proposing its termi-
nal and pipeline, became extremely frustrated, obviously, and
from a cost standpoint, having spent millions of dollars attempt-
ing to secure their goal, it finally decided to abandon its proposal.
Now, we've talked about the staleness of the record problem and
how you deal with that. From that standpoint, there has to come
some point at which you draw some lines, because otherwise the
record would always be stale in the process we have. The degree
of staleness would be another thing, but it would be stale to some
extent or the other.
My question really comes down to, at what point do the dollars
involved really become so enormous that we can't back away
from one standpoint, or at what point does it become so
financially unfeasible that we can't afford to even begin?
McKinney: I might touch upon that one just a little bit. One of
the long run advantages of a capital-intensive energy project is
that once the capital is fixed, rate treatment is such that the cost
component to the consumer declines with time, whereas the com-
modity cost of the material you're transporting is going up, so it
tends to level the cost a bit over the raw energy cost and the cost
of oil, which of course do not have a high capital component.
When you talk about where it becomes uneconomical to pro-
ceed because of increasing costs, the cost of oil must be the focal
point. It sets the cost of energy at a higher rate than has the cost
of the capital portion of the plant. We changed the scope to some
degree as we went through the California process when they im-
posed some additional things on us, but, by and large, the main
problems are the carrying costs and that each year there's an-
other ten to fifteen percent added on because of inflation. Some
years, oil costs have gone up something like eighty percent.
So as long as we're in that kind of an environment, you don't
price the LNG facility out of the business. When it is finally put
in place, it does provide a shelter to offset some of the increasing
costs of the fuel. As to when you have so much sunk in a given
facility that it must go forward, that's really not a decision of the
sponsor. We propose, the regulators dispose, and we have to deal
with that after the fact.
Clarke: Along those lines, I'd just like to point out that the PUC
has a policy of pricing our sales to our low priority customers
based upon the alternate fuel costs in Southern California. So the
direct parallel to oil and gas is a very appropriate one. We are
now required to charge a price which must be competitive with al-
ternative fuels in Southern California.
Thus, the Commission, through its policies, has determined the
high priority customers, who then pick up less of the total costs of
providing service on a system that would otherwise be economi-
cally allocated to them.
So there is a direct relationship between what oil is selling for
in Southern California and what gas is selling for in Southern
California by PUC mandate.
Wilson: Your question gets back to my old notion of policy and
involvement. I don't think that putting the PUC in the boardroom
is an attractive way to proceed. Nor do I think it is an attractive
way to proceed through our present reactionary process of energy
siting. The process that is laid out for us by the PUC or the FERC
is always one of reacting to the proposal of the utility.
It seems to me that there should be some kind of holding of
hands, if you will, in going forward and making and planning our
energy needs. I agree you should air all of the concerns in an ad-
versary proceeding. This raises questions of whether the adver-
sary proceeding is the appropriate type of forum to make and
decide those types of issues.
In looking at the financial market, its sponsors being Pacific
Lighting and PG&E, you realize that they have only so many dol-
lars to spend and that, at some point in time, they might have to
say, "We can't do it." In fact, there have been times when they've
said, "If we had to go to the financial market today, we couldn't
raise the money to build this facility."
McKinney: No, I don't think we've said that, Lionel. We've said
we might not like the interest rate.
Wilson: One of your sponsors has told me that anyway.
McKinney: It's just the cost of money, I think.
Wilson: Well, they know it wouldn't make any sense to go to
the market at that time. Let me just throw another light on the
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subject, and this is not LNG related in terms of determining at
what point you back out of a project, but it certainly is related to
the Diablo Canyon facility, the prime example of this problem, al-
though we're getting there in LNG.
You have one and one half or two billion dollars of money in-
vested in that facility and a proceeding going on now to determine
whether or not that facility should ever be utilized. Can you back
out at this point in time? I don't know. The Governor seems to
have one point of view, and certainly the utility has another. Re-
gardless of who wins, the person who's going to be impacted by
the decision is the California rate payer.
McKinney: I might just make a comment on that. Praise be
that in the case of natural gas the federal regulators and the Con-
gress did not expose gas facilities to the same double jeopardy
they have applied to nuclear plants. A nuclear plant is required
to get a construction permit, and then, after it is fully completed
and ready to go into operation, is required to get an operating
license.
This approach was urged on the federal regulators in our case
as a way, in effect, to make it very difficult to finance, because that
would be a shadow over it. We were going to project financing
such that the facility was almost like a revenue bond in treat-
ment. That approach was specifically rejected by the Department
of Energy decision makers in language that said, if the facility is
allowed to be constructed, it should be allowed to be operated.
Obviously there are safety reviews; there are many, many reviews
and ongoing regulation. The depth of regulation is more intense
than many of you here might realize.
While we may not have a utility commission representative in
the board room, we surely have him in our shop. Furthermore,
we will have them all over the plant site. So it is intense, and we
will have it in both jurisdictions.
Unidentified: Just a comment from California's point of view,
and at least the CPUC's, LNG has proved to be novel. It's novel
with respect to the amount of time we've spent in reviewing and
reaching a decision on the project. If you look to PG&E's applica-
tion to build Diablo Canyon before the California Public Utilities
Commission, I can't remember how many days of hearings were
spent, but there were seventeen pages written on the decision,
and, at most, there were two to three weeks of hearings. You
know that here in California we've had over 100 days of hearings
on LNG. The decision itself was very voluminous.
The second thing is that the mandate by the Legislature to in-
volve the PUC in the ongoing monitoring of the terminal, from
cost and safety construction points of view, was certainly a novel
kind of approach, not even utilized by the NRC itself. The NRC
uses a licensing function as an alternative. The monitoring re-
quirement puts us in an entirely different position than we've
ever been in before, in terms of finally signing off, approving the
cost, and passing them on to the California rate payer.
Island: I think you can see the complexities of the process and
the shifts that have been taken as we've gone through it. I think
this group should recognize that staleness of the record comes
about for a couple of reasons. One is because agencies take a
long time to go through the process, perhaps longer than is truly
necessary. In this case, I can point to a couple of examples where
there were significant stretches of time when nothing was hap-
pening because the agency wasn't given a priority that could've
kept things happening. Secondly, some of the delay can also be
attributed to the very active opposition by Bixby Ranch Company
and the Hollister Ranch owners, which illustrates that if staleness
of record through opposition can be grounds to reopen and reliti-
gate the case, then the opponents to major projects have an auto-
matic win.
Moderator: I'm going to allow a short rebuttal for that, and then
we need to break for lunch. We'll take up some other aspects this
afternoon.
Liss: I just want to address this staleness question in a more
academic fashion. It's a very difficult problem that the agencies
face. On the one hand, if there are opponents, there is going to be
a larger stretch of time than if there are not. If the utilities could
walk in, put the evidence down on the table, and get the stamp of
approval, then there would be a shorter process. But presumably,
if there's opposition and if it's opposition that takes time, it's be-
cause the opposition is worth listening to, and it takes time to
evaluate that.
On the staleness question, what, in essence, you've got is an in-
herently long process with evidence put in at a certain time.
You've got all kinds of developments. You look back a couple of
years later, and someone then says, "Hey, wait a minute, there
have been changed circumstances. Your decision or your evi-
dence is outdated. You shouldn't make a decision on the basis of
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this evidence because you're going to be making a decision on
useless, irrelevant evidence."
Now, the opposition to that contention is going to be, "It's not
useless and irrelevant evidence. Of course there have been some
minor changes, but you've got to stop somewhere, and let's draw
the line here. Nothing major has happened."
The issue is joined on whether anything major has happened or
not, and it's a judgment call that the agency has to make. Obvi-
ously, our side on supply and demand is saying, 'There have been
major developments," and the other side is saying, "No, there ha-
ven't." But it is not as if there can be a policy established on
staleness, which, upon reopening the record, should be applied in
every case. It turns simply on the question of whether the evi-
dence is new or not; if it is new and if it's significant, then I would
submit that an agency has no choice but to reopen the record.
Otherwise, it is making a truly irrelevant decision by making a de-
cision on the basis of evidence that is not up to date.
Wilson: One comment is that one of the interesting things from
our point of view, and what has actually happened, is it really was
the discovery of the Arroyo fault on the site that slowed things
down, preventing a final decision. WLNG proposed, at that time
in their brief, that the Commission grant the permit and allow
them to go forward with the construction using as a basis their
agreement to go out and do all the necessary geologic and seismic
studies and gear their construction criteria based upon what they
discovered. It would have been possible for the PUC to construct
its decision in such a light. It may be possible that, as a result of
all this study, it might have been the right thing to do. Seismi-
cally speaking, in terms of construction and safety, the real ques-
tion is whether or not the time elapsed has provided an
opportunity to see where we are going with this project.
Moderator: Okay, Gentlemen, I'm going to terminate the dis-
cussion even though it will be unsatisfactory to everyone, I'm
sure, and close this part of the program with the comment that I
think one of the most useful things out of this is that it's given us
the opportunity for old friends to get together. We'll resume our
discussion at two o'clock.
Moderator: I want to allow some time at the end of our presen-
tation for those frustrated people out in the audience to relieve
themselves of their questions.
I want to introduce Mr. Charles Warren.
Warren: I have as a title for my remarks today on LNG and the
decision-making process: "On Feeding Caviar To Chickens," the
meaning and relevancy of which will become a little clearer later
in my remarks.
I think it's fair to say that, recently, California electric utilities
have begun to respond to over six years of government efforts to
turn California's economy away from the policy of accommodat-
ing unrestrained energy demand using traditional nonrenewable
energy supplies and toward an economy of more efficient and pro-
ductive utilization of energy of all kinds, but with greater empha-
sis on nontraditional energy sources such as direct solar, wind,
geothermal, and so forth.
Current projections by the California Energy Commission and
the electric utilities agree that the demand for electricity in Cali-
fornia will grow at a rate of no more, and probably less, than 1.7%
a year. That figure is significant because it represents a decline of
300% of the rate of growth projected by the utilities only six years
ago. This decline is testimony to California's growing energy effi-
ciency, productivity, and electric utility realization. The historical
policies designed to boost growth rates are counterproductive in
terms of utility profits. In addition, Southern California Edison
has recently announced plans to meet about thirty percent of its
projected electricity demand growth from such renewable and al-
ternate supply sources as wind, geothermal, solar, fuel cells, and
cogeneration. It's further testimony to efficiency and productivity
that such sources are approaching technical and economical feasi-
bility at a rate far faster than most corporate managers and gov-
ernment officials realize.
On the other hand, decisions of natural gas utility managers
seem to reflect the same archaic and immovable mentality that
eletcric utility managers once held but are now abandoning. This
is particularly true when it comes to their plan for LNG, the na-
ture and site of which are the subject issues of this Symposium.
Let's examine that allegation.
It seems clear, at least to me, that the current commitment by
gas utilities to LNG generally, and to Point Conception specifi-
cally, cannot now be either justified or explained, other than by a
stubborn attachment to primitive and outmoded utility manage-
ment policies. As I will attempt to show, not only is the technol-
ogy of LNG uncertain, but its economics, its safety, and its
usefulness are all questionable. Furthermore, Point Conception,
as a site, is among the most seismically active, the most naviga-
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tionally treacherous, and the most pristine of the few remaining
undeveloped areas on California's coast.
First, let's examine LNG generally, by reviewing its history and
its present status in the United States, and I ask your forgiveness
if I'm covering ground already laid or tilled this morning. Pres-
ently, the United States and California use natural gas for approx-
imately twenty-five percent of their energy needs, or to put it
another way, for about one-half of all nontransportation energy
requirements. Nationally, annual consumption is about twenty
trillion cubic feet. Most of our supplies are produced domesti-
cally, and that portion is rising significantly as federal price con-
trols gradually expire. Supplemental supplies are imported by
pipeline from Mexico and Canada and will be piped from Alaska
by the proposed Al-Can pipeline system, a western leg of which
will link up with the California natural distribution system.
Two California distributors, Pacific Lighting Corporation and
PG&E, through a subsidiary corporation, WLNG, have proposed
importing additional supplies of natural gas from Indonesia and
Alaska using cryogenic technologies. Now, these technologies re-
quire large capital expenditures for liquefying, transporting, and
regasifying the product, a process which adds to the cost of the
natural gas approximately $1.50 to $1.70 for every thousand cubic
feet of product. It is a technology as yet unperfected and requir-
ing special consideration for shipment, unloading, storage, and
processing. Just two examples might be cited for that. Among
the more recent and prominent were the rejection of the three
brand new and unused Avondale tankers, which resulted in the
largest marine insurance payment by Lloyds of London in its his-
tory. All were cryogenic tankers, and all were found to have had
defects which made them unacceptable for use as designed.
Secondly, let's examine the recent three month shutdown of the
Cove Point, Maryland facility, when no more than a cup full of
LNG spilled and blew up the switchgear building. Now there are
presently in the United States three LNG product facilities in
place. One, by District Gas Corporation, is located in Everett,
Massachusetts and is capable of importing about forty-two billion
cubic feet a year from Algeria. The second, owned by Columbia
Consolidated, is located at Cove Point, Maryland, as I just men-
tioned. That facility has imported up to 130 billion cubic feet
yearly, also from Algeria. The third belongs to the Southern En-
ergy Company at Elba Island, Georgia, and has imported up to
130 billion cubic feet yearly from Algeria. All three, when totaled,
provide less than two percent of the natural gas provided for our
national consumption.
Since April 1 of this year, all those facilities but the District Gas
Facility have been shut down, and their tankers are idle because
of a price dispute between the United States, on behalf of the El
Paso Gas Company, and Algeria, on behalf of its marketing corpo-
ration, Sonatrack. Algeria seeks to price its resource on a BTU
equivalency basis with crude oil, which would mean a price of
about $6.00 a thousand cubic feet. This would mean that transpor-
tation and processing costs of approximately $1.70 would be ad-
ded, as I've indicated before.
The United States utilities would be paying $7.70 per thousand
cubic feet at the distribution pipeline. The U.S. position in the
dispute is that the price should be equivalent to residual oil be-
cause that is a product form which can be used as a boiler fuel for
a price as it works out on a BTU basis of about $4.47 a thousand
cubic feet, the price which we are in fact paying Mexico and Ca-
nada for their pipeline gas. It is the further position of the United
States that the $4.47 price should include transportation and
processing costs. This would mean that Algeria would receive no
more than about $2.80 a thousand cubic feet at its point of export.
The dispute is still unresolved and, as a result, for the last eight
months, Algeria has refused to ship LNG to the U.S. facilities, and
all those expensive cryogenic vessels and processing plants have
been idle.
As further point, Algeria has not abandoned its stated efforts to
form a cartel of natural gas exporting nations to support its goal
of crude oil price equivalency, and Indonesia, its partner in
OPEC, is a target member. Now, the argument used by Algeria in
this dispute is telling and instructive for California. As quoted in
the Oil and Gas Journal of July 21 of this year, Algeria argued:
"The fact some consumers opt to use gas as lowgrade, steam-rais-
ing fuel can no longer determine its price. It is as if an eccentric
farmer were to claim that because he wishes to feed caviar to his
chickens the price of caviar should be the same as that of corn."
In the meantime, back in California, despite all the questions
suggested by this history of supply and price unreliability, natural
gas utilities continue to spend significant amounts of money, as
much as $260,000,000 according to recent estimates, to increase the
dependency of California consumers on LNG.
Let's examine some of the questions this history suggests,
which lawyers and policy makers should reflect on in determining
the issues involved in this controversy. First, is LNG needed in
[Vol. 9: 1, 1981] Energy in the Eighties
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
California? Perhaps there is such a need that any price would be
reasonable. But contrary to the alarms which utility executives
have used to panic business leaders and public officials alike, the
answer is clearly no, not in the foreseeable future. It is fairly
clear that for the next several, at least twelve, years natural gas
requirements for uses other than as fuel for steam boilers to gen-
erate electricity will be met from the lower forty-eight Canadian,
Mexican, and Alaskan sources.
So all residential, commercial, chemical, and other industrial re-
quirements will be met over the next twelve years or more with-
out the need for foreign LNG supplies. As the Algerian analogy of
feeding caviar to chickens suggests, using LNG to fuel electric
utility boilers is an expensive eccentricity, particularly for those
who consume electricity.
To make matters worse, PG&E, for example, cannot show a
need for LNG even as a boiler fuel for the next twelve year fore-
cast period. In other words, PG&E can't show a use for the LNG
even as caviar for chickens. As for Southern California Gas,
PG&E's WLNG partner, it can meet all nonutility boiler fuel
needs and a significant share, and perhaps all, of utility boiler fuel
requirements for the next twelve years or more. According to the
1980 California Gas Report and the utilities' own figures, in 1992,
for Northern California, the normal requirements of all natural
gas users, including utility boilers, will be met, and a surplus of
possibly as much as 500 million cubic feet a day will remain. In
Southern California, all such needs, including possibly utility
boilers, will be met, and a surplus of as much as 300 million cubic
feet a day will remain-so much for the need for the product in
California.
Next, let's just assume the possibility that, in Southern Califor-
nia at least, there should be an opportunity to market reprocessed
natural gas from LNG to electric utility customers. The question
then would become, whether it would be legal for it to be done
within the critical time period or in the time period beyond twelve
years. The fact is that the Power Plapt Act and the Industrial
Fuel Use Act prohibit the use of natural gas as a primary energy
source in new power plants and further prohibit its use in old
plants after January 1, 1990 and, until then, requires that natural
gas be used only in such proportions as were used during the
1974-1976 period.
Noteworthy is that the same Act requires the utilities to use al-
ternate fuels such as petroleum, coke, biomass, industrial and ag-
ricultural wastes, geothermal, and renewable sources to make up
for the withdrawal of natural gas from utility boilers; in short, to
do what Southern California Edison, an electric utility, is in the
process of doing. Thus, even if Southern California Gas acquires
LNG for its utility customers, it is clear that present law would
prohibit its use for such a purpose. It follows, there being no legal
market for the resource, that there is no demonstrable need for
LNG for any purpose, even for Southern California.
A third question: is LNG less expensive than either domestic
or other pipeline imported natural gas from Canada, Mexico, or
Alaska? The answer is no.
LNG, under all price scenarios, is much more expensive. Do-
mestic natural gas is and will remain price regulated for a number
of years. The current average price is less than $2.00 a thousand
cubic feet. As we have seen, Canada and Mexico have price par-
ity and charge $4.47 per thousand cubic feet. As for LNG, except
as noted, it is no longer available at all, and its major supplier
since April 1, 1980, has been refusing to sell for less than $6.11 per
thousand cubic feet. Admittedly, rumor has it that the United
States and Algeria may agree to a price compromise, but under
no conceivable circumstance would such a compromise be at a
delivered price less than charged by Mexico and Canada. It is for
these and other reasons that Fortune Magazine recently reported
that El Paso, the company that imports LNG to east coast facili-
ties, is "edging away" from the LNG business, and I say, so
should WLNG here in California.
Fourth, will Indonesia follow Algeria's pricing policy for LNG?
The answer is no one knows, and I suspect not even WLNG itself
knows. At present, the terms of an agreement between Indonesia
and WLNG associates have not been set and are not known.
However, since both Indonesia and Algeria are members of OPEC
and have collaborated in establishing price parity of their petro-
leum exports, it is most unlikely they would not do the same in
respect to their LNG exports. Recall that it is a specific goal of
Algeria to form a cartel of natural gas exporters, as well as to
bring natural gas into price equivalency with oil at point of ship-
ment, rather than at point of regasification. Indonesia has already
given notice that it desires to renegotiate the price of its supplies.
It is most likely that the renegotiated price will be close to or on a
par with whatever price is ultimately negotiated with Algeria. It
is, understandable why the Oil and Gas Journal reported on July
21 of this year that LNG imports are likely to be phased out for
reasons of safety, price, and reduction of import dependence.
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The fifth question: is LNG safe? Do its benefits, limited as they
now appear to be, justify the risk? At the heart of much of the
concern about safety is the fact that LNG is transported and
stored in massive quantities while being maintained at a tempera-
ture of -162 degrees centigrade, by which is accomplished a 600
fold reduction in volume. Should LNG spill out of any of its con-
tainment vessels, it begins to vaporize into a colorless gas, which
hugs the ground or water surface, freezing or asphyxiating. When
mixed in air with portions of about five to fifteen percent, it
becomes flammable. Exposed to any flame, say from a cigarette
lighter, a pilot light, or a barbeque pit, the resulting fire would
race back to its point of origin, possibly as far as fifty kilometers
away, incinerating everything in its path.
There are other hazards. LNG is so cold that if it should leak
from its double steel walled insulated containment vessels, it
would embrittle and fracture the outer wall, thereby permitting
greater leakage and spills. This is what happened in Cleveland in
1944, when over 100 persons were killed. But as this-was long ago,
the question might well be asked, has our technology since Cleve-
land acceptably improved? The answers are yes, it has improved,
but no, not acceptably. As stated earlier, only recently did Lloyds
of London make the largest marine payment in its history when it
was learned that three brand new LNG tankers contained flaws of
such magnitude they had to be junked.
Further risks of LNG stem from the fact that when it is spilled
on water it can explode without ignition, as occurred in 1973, at a
place called Convie Island on the Thames River. Also possible is
the phenomena called "rollover," which occurs when LNG is
transferred into a tank partially filled with LNG of a different den-
sity, causing rupture of the tank and valves. This happened in It-
aly in 1971. Or recently, in November of 1979, at the Cold Point,
Maryland LNG facility, a small amount, no more than a cupful, of
LNG spilled out of a seal onto an electric circuit. An employee in-
vestigating the leak flipped on a switch which caused a spark
which then caused the vaporized gas to explode, causing the
death of the employee, injury to others, and the shutdown of the
plant for four months.
My sixth question: does LNG reduce the dependence of the
United States on foreign supplies and thereby provide greater en-
ergy security? One would think that the answer to such a ques-
tion obviously would be no. The obvious in this instance appears
to me to be correct. It does not contribute to the nation's energy
security to substitute imported LNG for imported petroleum from
the same nation, in this instance, Indonesia, or any other nation.
Yet, curiously, that very argument was made by Assistant Secre-
tary of the Department of State, Mr. Julius Katz, in a July 24, 1979
letter to the Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulating Commis-
sion, urging approval of the application to import Indonesian LNG
at Point Conception. Approval was urged because, as Mr. Katz
wrote: "Our nation is critically dependent on foreign oil which is
in short supply and for which there are inherent risks to supply
reliability. The Pak-Indo Project, if approved, would reduce the
nation's reliance on imported oil." Given the Algerian LNG em-
bargo, Mr. Katz's plea sounds somewhat off the mark. It is note-
worthy that Mr. Katz's intrusion into a regulatory proceeding was
by letter and not by any offer to appear personally so that his
views might be scrutinized by public cross-examination. This was
an ex-parte contact, the variety of which corrupts quasi-judicial
administrative processes.
Seventh, if the law is modified to allow California utilities to use
more natural gas as boiler fuel and such use requires the importa-
tion of natural gas supplies, should such supplies be in LNG form
or is there a more suitable alternative? The answer to this ques-
tion is that there is such an alternative, and it is methanol.
Natural gas can be converted in the field to methanol, which in
its liquid form can be transported through existing pipelines and
oil tankers. Furthermore, it can be easily stored in large quanti-
ties and in heavily populated areas. It can be burned directly in
utility boilers and can be used for a number of other purposes,
such as a transportation fuel, a chemical feedstock, a source of
hydrogen for fertilizers, and so forth.
Given the uncertainty surrounding LNG, its need, its cost, its
safety, its availability, and its only foreseeable use in California
as a boiler fuel, it would seem appropriate now for government
and corporate decision makers alike to postpone the rush to LNG
and at least consider whether alternatives, such as methanol,
might be more suitable for our national and state long-term
needs.
Given what we know about the lack of need for LNG generally,
and the economics and technology of LNG, what questions or con-
siderations are there specifically for the proposed terminal of
Point Conception, California? It is clear that the Point Concep-
tion area is seismically active. The most recent large earthquake
occurred on November 4, 1927, with an estimated magnitude of 7.3
on the Richter scale. In a recent report, the United States Geolog-
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ical Survey (USGS) found: "The Point Conception-Gaviota area
and its offshore bench are underlaid by shallow reverse faults, in-
cluding the Arroyo, the F-i, and the South Santa Inez, which have
deformed the bedrock surface and its young cover. These faults
are structurally inseparable elements of a regional system of re-
verse faults in a regime of ongoing compressive deformation. As
a unit, the Point Conception-Gaviota area is being uplifted at long
term average rates of three to four millimeters a year with his-
toric pulses that exceed twenty-eight millimeters a year." These
rates are comparable to the highest rates recorded on the west
coast of the coterminous United States. Furthermore, the USGS
has suggested: "Faults such as the F-1 and the South Santa Inez
should be considered potential generators of earthquakes of at
least Richter magnitude of 7.5."
Second, given the seismic nature and potential activity in the
area, are there safety standards by which the non expert can be
guided? Let's assume that none of us know what to do with the
7.5 Richter magnitude at that area in an LNG facility. Is there
some standard that we might consider? Yes, there are such stan-
dards; but, unfortunately, it would be difficult for us to be guided
by them.
Now, the reason that we cannot be guided by them is that they
conflict. Federal standards suggest that, if applied to Point Con-
ception, the project under consideration should not be approved.
California standards leave it all up to administrative discretion.
Let me explain. In amendments to the Natural Gas Pipeline
Safety Act, Congress instructed the Department of Transporta-
tion, through its Materials Transportation Board, to adopt safety
regulations for the siting, design, construction, inspection, and
testing of any new LNG facility. Having done that, however, Con-
gress went on to specifically exempt the proposed LNG facility at
Point Conception from such regulations, at least in its present de-
sign configuration. Section 193.2061(f) of the regulations prohibits
a LNG storage tank from being located in areas of high seismic
activity. That regulation was adopted by the Department of
Transportation after rejecting the arguments of WLNG that lique-
fied natural gas facilities should not be prohibited at any location
because designers could design an LNG storage tank to accommo-
date any seismic force.
That latter argument, by the way, is the position and view of the
California Public Utilities Commission. The Department of
Transportation's Materials Transportation Board, however, re-
jected such arguments by commenting: "The Materials Transpor-
tation Board believes that the consequences of a very severe
earthquake are so significant that it is not in the public interest to
permit construction of an LNG storage tank in these areas. The
MTB believes that because LNG storage tanks have not exper-
ienced very severe earthquakes there has been no substantiation
of arguments by commenters that such earthquake forces can be
handled by appropriate design." While it is clear, by the present
seismic record, that the LNG facility at Point Conception would
probably not be permitted under federal regulations, it is equally
clear that, unless circumstances intervene, the project is not sub-
ject to federal regulation. One might wonder, however, upon what
evidence and how it came about that California's Public Utilities
Commission adopted a standard less rigorous for seismic safety
than did the federal government.
Third, given that Point Conception is near Vandenberg Air
Force Base, which is used for missile launchings in the Pacific
missile range, are there any special concerns that debris from an
aborted missile launch could impact the LNG facility? I'm kind of
glad I asked that question, I will answer it. On August 28th of last
year, the United States Air Force filed a petition with the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to intervene in its proceedings
concerning the LNG facility at Point Conception. In its petition,
the Air Force stated that the LNG terminal would be situated
about six miles below the flight path of various rocket launchings,
that it would be within the impact debris footprint of space shut-
tle launches planned for Vandenberg, and that there was a real
possibility that such debris would fall on board approaching tank-
ers or on the terminal itself, all facilities which were described as
containing inherently volatile and dangerous property.
Immediately, as a result of activities, the Secretary of the Air
Force withdrew the petition based on the LNG sponsor's agree-
ment to hold harmless the Air Force in the event of any disaster.
Now, I ask you, how is it that the willingness of WLNG to hold
harmless the Air Force for any damage to life and property makes
a contribution to public health and safety? It is, to say the least,
rather obscure.
Fourth, have the natural gas utilities taken all steps to conserve
and use more efficiently California's own natural gas supplies and
to turn to renewable energy sources? The answer, unfortunately,
is no. It is clear that with prudent and responsible management,
forecasted future demand for natural gas estimates could proba-
bly be reduced. Only recently, Southern California Gas filed ob-
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jections to an order from the PUC establishing conservation and
solar goals. I think it is not unreasonable to ask why California's
natural gas utilities are unwilling or reluctant to pursue conserva-
tion and renewable energy sources with the same vigor and en-
thusiasm as electric utilities, while at the same time pursuing a
program which would increase California's dependence on a sup-
ply source and technology which are unreliable, costly, risky, and
foreign?
Fifth, under all the circumstances, is the investment commit-
ment to the Point Conception project prudent within the meaning
of the Public Utility Commission's policy of disallowing impru-
dent investments? The answer would seem to be no. In October
of this year, for example, the PUC reduced PG&E's gas cost bal-
ancing account by almost $14,000,000 when it found that the utility
had been "imprudent in the operation of its gas system in regard
to purchases of Canadian gas and reduced purchases of less ex-
pensive California gas." The Public Utilities Commission said:
"Our basic concern is with PG&E's lack of response to the Cana-
dian price increase, that is, the $4.47. There was no recognition
that national energy policy supported the reduction of purchases
to the level needed immediately to prevent a severe adverse im-
pact on the public health, safety, or welfare. The last increment
of Canadian supply was plainly unnecessary for planning pur-
poses except to provide additional service to priority five, that is
utility boilers, thereby displacing less expensive fuel oil on a BTU
equivalent basis with additional carrying costs for oil storage."
The PUC went on to paraphrase the eloquent electric conserva-
tion message offered by PG&E. The message is, what's the point
of turning off the juice if PG&E won't turn back the tankers? My
point is this, if it is imprudent to import pipeline gas which is
more expensive and available than domestic, is it not equally im-
prudent to import liquefied gas which will be more expensive
than either domestic or Canadian and Mexican supplies?
Sixth, and finally, why is all this happening? The question is
difficult to answer. My guess is that the utilities believe that by
joining California's economy to a capital-intensive and expensive
resource they could possibly enhance their profit position as a re-
sult of their rate of return guaranteed, rather than if they pursued
less expensive and available alternatives. I hope there is another
explanation than that.
As to the importation business, my guess is that labor and com-
munity leaders, as well as public officials, were panicked by state-
ments by project sponsors only three years ago that "unless
California permitted LNG by the winter of 1980 and 1981 there
would be an energy depression which would result in increased
unemployment of fifteen percent, forcing 700,000 presently em-
ployed persons out of work in Southern California alone." Mr. Jo-
seph Wrench, President of Pacific Lighting, of which Southern
California Gas Company is a subsidiary, made that prediction.
I leave it to representatives of the industry here today to ex-
plain what went wrong with those estimates, and I submit to you
that California should now abandon this effort to feed caviar to
chickens and get on with the business of more suitably meeting
California's future energy requirements.
Moderator: I would now like to introduce the panelists for the
afternoon session. To my immediate left is Mr. Marc McGinnes of
Santa Barbara.
To his immediate left is Mr. John Geesman, who is the Execu-
tive Director of the California Energy Commission.
On my far right is Mr. Thomas Clarke, whom we introduced this
morning as Assistant General Counsel for Pacific Lighting
Corporation.
To his immediate left is Mr. Peter Jonker, Manager of Govern-
mental and Public Affairs for WLNG Terminal Associates.
To his immediate left and my immediate right is Mr. Charles E.
Greenberg, who is a partner in Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown &
Baerwitz of Long Beach.
I'd like to turn to our topic today. I think in all fairness we
might allow just a few minutes for some discussion of the re-
marks which were made in the address, and so I will ask if any-
one wants to comment briefly, because I want to turn to the role
of the attorneys. Would anyone like to comment briefly on the re-
marks which were made?
Clarke: Yes, I'd like to make some comments, not surprisingly,
I'm sure. Mr. Warren is an eloquent speaker, a very gifted person
evidently, but the Federal Power Commission and the FERC,
which made the decision on each of the issues Mr. Warren enu-
merated, heard all those arguments and rejected each and every
one of them for very good reasons. It's just astonishing to me that
with all that eloquence opponents were unable to even convince
so much as one of five commissioners that those were considera-
tions that merited the dire consequences that he addressed to
this group today.
The same applies to the California Commission, which looked
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at each one of those issues extensively. I wouldn't want this
group to think that this has all been done in a vacuum, that some-
how these are being discovered for the first time. We've litigated
these issues. We are continuing to litigate the seismic issue.
Hearings will be held here in California, and I think on the fed-
eral level as well, as to the importance of the seismic data.
Also, the USGS survey that was referred to by Mr. Warren will
be the subject, I believe, of some inquiries at the federal level,
which has been directed by the courts to consider that as an ele-
ment. We have marshaled on our side, I think, some of the finest
experts in the world in the seismic area. We have Dr. Nathan
Newmark, who is one of the world's foremost seismic engineers.
We have the expertise of Dames & Moore, of Fluor, and many of
the other very renowned engineering companies in the country,
and it is their opinion, as has been filed with the PUC most re-
cently and with the federal government, that we can operate an
LNG terminal safely and efficiently at Point Conception. That's
the state of the record. That is the determination that has been
made up to this point by the federal government and by the state
government. Nothing yet has overturned that. I just want to
make that statement perfectly clear right now; that is the state of
the record, and those arguments have all been made and rejected.
Thank you.
Greenberg: I guess I'm the only one whom you've heard today
who doesn't have much of a stake in the LNG terminal. I do rep-
resent the Hollister Ranch, just below the LNG facility, but I am
involved with their problems with the Coastal Commission on
public access, not this situation. Unlike Mr. Warren, who is a con-
sultant for the Bixby Ranch, just to the north of us, on this partic-
ular problem, as I understand it, I think I can speak about it
objectively, and I don't want to talk about whether LNG is good or
bad. I want to talk about the impact of a speech like Mr. Warren's
so that you can understand why, through the decade of the Sev-
enties, we had so much trouble in obtaining a permitting tract of a
project of any kind through California's and the federal govern-
ment's environmental regulatory schemes. That was a powerful
speech, albeit, as I think the LNG fellow said, everyone of those
arguments has been heard ad nauseum by everybody, probably
since 1973 or whenever they started this permitting tract. You
haven't heard them, and they must have impressed the hell out of
you. Whether they're true or not, I'm not going to comment, but
everytime the LNG spokesmen who have the set of mind that we
had in the 1970's make speeches like that, then the LNG project
correctly or incorrectly starts off with two strikes against it in the
minds of those who are listening to it.
Now, I can't comment on Mr. Warren with respect to his posi-
tion on LNG. I can vividly remember his position with respect to
the Sohio project, because I represented Sohio. There, all we
heard from Mr. Warren for years was the skillful kind of blending
of economics of the oil industry, which I knew were nutty, be-
cause I knew the economics of the oil industry. I don't mean
nutty in the sense of being crazy. I mean they were seen through
dark glasses. Combined with, as he did here, throwing in little
phrases like a cupful of LNG blowing up a switch gear and a little
aside here of a cartel of gas exploiting nations, all that kind of in-
formation was readily transferred from the project that I worked
on and suffered from, even got the bald spot on my head from, the
Sohio project.
The final comment with respect to Sohio, very similar to what
was said here about LNG by Mr. Warren, was why should Califor-
nia help solve a marketing problem for an English oil company?
That was his basic position. Well, the other people who weren't
happy with the Sohio project, Tom Quinn, Mary Nichols, Rich
Mullin and all those state people, even the Governor, are now
scurrying around desperately trying to find someone to build us a
pipeline to take oil from California, heavy oil that we're now de-
veloping in the Bakersfield area, and other surplus oil that we
have here in California, to a market. Because, as long as we don't
have a pipeline, there is a cork in the bottle, and we can't take
that oil to market.
That same sort of very skillful blending was what happened
with Sohio. I can tell you what was fact and what was fantasy; I
can also tell you how LNG has given me a sort of deja vu, espe-
cially as I listened to this speech by Mr. Warren. I do think that
he is the most articulate man I've ever heard, but with all due re-
spect, I believe he is the voice of the Seventies; he is the voice of
a permitting net that has got us into some of the problems we
were talking about today and which I hope we can address fur-
ther as the afternoon goes on.
Geesman: I guess, in terms of my response, I need to explain a
little bit about my agency. We were set up by legislation, au-
thored by then Assemblyman Charles Warren, in the early 1970's
to attempt to apply some principles of strategic planning to the
electrical sector. It was thought that since utilities are not com-
petitive businesses, some of the sophisticated forecasting tools
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and strategic planning techniques utilized in the competitive mar-
ket sector should be made to apply to the utilities. The principal
concern on the part of the Legislature at the time was the
proliferation of nuclear power plants. Mr. Warren, along with
Senator Alfred Alquist, authored legislation that set up, on a state
basis, something of an energy mobilization board, where a local
permit system would be eliminated; the State would come in and
make a permit decision based on state-wide interests.
We were supposed to conduct an independent assessment of
demand growth so that we would not be reliant exclusively on
utility data. We were supposed to assess, on a probability basis,
technological risks, safety risks, and the availability of different
alternative sources of electrical supply. We were supposed, and
this was embedded in our statutory mandate, to place a supply
preference on energy conservation. Even in the early Seventies,
the Legislature felt that the key to California's energy future
would lie in improving energy efficiency. Finally, we were sup-
posed to promote renewable sources of energy as preferred sup-
ply sources.
With respect to the decision-making that went on surrounding
the natural gas sector, as distinct from the electrical sector, I have
to say today that, as a state energy official, I'm somewhat
ashamed to sit in front of you and profess to have any higher level
of optimism or confidence than my colleague at the Public Utili-
ties Commission, Mr. Wilson, expressed to you this morning
about the clarity or soundness of California energy policy on nat-
ural gas at the time the LNG Terminal Act was adopted.
The situation in 1977, in the California Legislature relating to
natural gas supplies, was radically different from anything that
has existed since then. We were told that 700,000 people in South-
ern California would be thrown out of work if this project were
not to move forward. We were told that would happen this win-
ter, and I think that involved some mistakes or poor calculations
as to when the project would actually become available. But the
fact of the matter was that it was a crisis environment.
I think that the company may have protested a little too much
this morning with respect to the political deal they were forced to
swallow. I believe that at the time they felt they were getting
more out of the deal by having a presumed fast-track siting pro-
cess. The Legislature was willing to establish that solely because
they were told 700,000 people would be unemployed if they didn't
establish such a fast-track.
Now, the need for the project was established in the legislation
as a test of whether the gas would be available or necessary for
high priority customers. The term "high priority" was not truly
defined. In the PUC investigation of the project, there was some
debate, although not a great deal, as to what "high priority"
meant. The Energy Commission took the position that "high pri-
ority" meant residential and small business. The companies took
the position, as did the PUC ultimately, that "high priority" meant
anything other than utility boilers, that is, residential, small busi-
ness, commercial sector, and industrial customer.
The point was made throughout the PUC proceedings, and I be-
lieve it still stands true today, that natural gas is such a wonderful
fuel in terms of the cleanliness of its combustion that you proba-
bly want just as much of it as you can burn no matter what the
priority of the customer is.
Mr. Warren spoke quite eloquently, although I think he was
paraphrasing Algerians about caviar for chickens. That is pre-
cisely what California utilities hopefully will be able to do in the
future. That is precisely what California state policy would like to
allow them to do in the future, in terms of burning natural gas in
the electrical sector. When you burn natural gas in electrical
power plants, you're not burning oil. Those of you, or those of us,
who consider ourselves environmentalists should consider nat-
ural gas to be a preferable source for generating electricity
through a combustion process. The air pollution impacts are
quite noticeable in terms of the preference that should be at-
tached to natural gas.
The issue this project faces right now is one of whether or not it
is the best source of natural gas. I guess the closest thing I'd say
in this round of remarks is that, in the electrical sector, we're re-
quired to place conservation as a priority and renewable energy
sources, such as solar, as a priority. Also, I have to say that Cali-
fornia's utilities, both gas and electrical, because Southern Cali-
fornia Gas has been one of the leaders there as well, have
adopted, under State prodding, the most aggressive conservation
and solar programs in the nation. The cost comparison that I
think the companies are going to have to make, to the satisfaction
of the PUC, before final approval is issued by the state for the
financing of the project, is whether the LNG project represents
the most economic source of natural gas. I don't think that issue
has been heard, at least at the state level. The state proceeding
determined a need for the project. It was expressly deferred as to
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whether the PUC would get into the tariff or bond guarantees or
precisely whether the cost of the project was justified.
Clarke: Can I comment for a moment on that? I'd like to say
that the aggressiveness with which we have pursued our conser-
vation program, which was recognized just a few weeks ago by a
presidential award to the Southern California Gas Company for
its outstanding efforts in that regard, is a good example to the na-
tion and the other distribution companies in the area of
conservation.
On the solar hearings, we did file a petition for rehearing and
minor modification. Mr. Warren made it sound as if we were
against solar energy. Therein, if you take the time to read, you'll
see that the PUC recognized the fact that the Southern California
Gas Company had the most imaginative and aggressive presenta-
tion-all designed to make solar energy possible in California-
and specifically said so. Thank you.
Unidentified: Mr. Greenberg characterizes Mr. Warren's voice
as being one of the Seventies. To my mind, Mr. Warren's voice is
a sensible one, and I hope it prevails in the Eighties and a good
deal beyond.
The statements that were made by the utility companies in the
1970's about the need for this project were not sensible ones, and
I think that we are still waiting for an answer to the question that
Mr. Warren posed. Where did those figures come from, that we
were going to have a fifty percent unemployment rate and 700,000
people out of jobs by today. Presumably, that has simply not oc-
curred. Those figures were overblown. They lacked all sense.
Furthermore, unfortunately, they were the basis upon which the
sovereign State of California legislated, supposedly in the public
interest, but, as we're seeing, there was very little public interest
in this project.
Clarke: I'd like to comment on that, if I may. First of all, I'd
like to discuss something about gas supply forecasts. Gas is not
an off-the-shelf item. You don't just run out and say: "Gee, I
want a couple of barrels of gas," and bring it in. It's very expen-
sive to get gas to California when you're looking at an interstate
pipeline, as we are through one of our own affiliates, Pacific Inter-
state, which is a member of the western leg consortium bringing
gas from North Alaska.
We're not only looking at LNG, but we're also involved in other
areas like pipeline activities. Any area we look to is going to be
expensive. Any new gas supply is going to be more expensive
than any current gas supply, and the availability of that gas sup-
ply in the future, as gas supplies become more and more scarce
and other people go out and compete for that gas supply, means a
concomitant rise in price.
Mr. Warren pointed out that gas supply prices are being deregu-
lated. That's true, they are. By 1985, large quantities of gas that
are presently under government regulation will no longer be regu-
lated. Therefore, if we're going to have energy to give many
Southern Californian people jobs and to warm their homes after
1985 and into the future, we have to be out there in the market-
place today securing those supplies. Through those efforts, we
can get gas here that might otherwise go to other areas of the
country.
The second point I'd like to make is that the predictions that
were made at that time were sensible in light of what we knew
and what we could reasonably have expected. Last year we had
the warmest winter in Southern California in forty years, and you
don't plan a gas supply on the basis of the possibility of having
the warmest winter in forty years for any future period of time.
That's not the assumption. You look at a cold year, and you look
at an average year, and then you make certain predictions as to
what the reasonable expectations can be.
Also, I'd like to address the fact that recently there has been an
upsurge in domestic production of natural gas and that it has in-
creased availability. That's true, and part of it is a result of the
NGPA. But it's not all the result of new drilling. A great deal of
that gas is now being made available for the first time through
what is known as 311b. In other words, gas that otherwise goes to
the intrastate market is now being freed up, and it's going into the
interstate market. That's creating a slight bubble, as we see it, in
our gas supply projections.
However, we don't anticipate that to continue. We do expect
that there will be a two or three year, at the outside, increase in
availability. The statistics all say the same thing; we're running
out of gas faster than we're producing it. We have a number of
options that we must go after in order to be able to get the energy
to maintain the lifestyle that we've become accustomed to.
One of those options, a very viable, sensible option, is LNG. We
can make a prediction today that there could be massive unem-
ployment five years from now, and it could be a very realistic pre-
diction, based on some sound assumptions, and, yet, it might not
reach, and hopefully would not reach, fruition. But we can't wait
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until the last minute to build these supplies. You have to do it
now, based on reasonable assumptions, and that's what we've
done. Thank you.
Moderator: I think we've got to cut off this discussion and move
on. We really need to get into the process of how you as attor-
neys and as people who participate in the process perceive the
process as really working. I think that's something which is criti-
cal information to us. Whatever your role, whether it be Mr.
Greenberg's, with his experience with Sohio, whether it be gov-
ernmental relations, or whether it be representing a particular lit-
igant, applicant, or intervenor, please help us a little bit in
understanding how the process really works.
The first question I want to ask is a little bit broad. To what ex-
tent, as you approach the process, is it really agency based versus
legislatively based? How do you know where the real power af-
fecting your project is going to lie? Does it appear to be, for in-
stance, a state agency process, and then you find out the process
is really federally based? As a part of that, what kind of inter-
agency rivalry or noncooperation do you encounter in the pro-
cess? I'm going to direct that to Mr. Greenberg first because his
experience with Sohio was a little bit different than we've heard
so far.
Greenberg: I think maybe, if you're law students, it might be
helpful to take that question and transpose it into the situation of
a client walking into your office with a major industrial energy
project. What is the first thing you do? You want to find the an-
swers to the kinds of questions that were just posed to the client
who doesn't have them. You don't know them either.
So what you do is go to the codes and do massive research on
the permitting net that is going to be required for the particular
project. Your client is very concerned about time frames. He al-
ways believes that, all evidence to the contrary with other
projects, certainly a year or eighteen months ought to be suffi-
cient for his wonderful project. He's very dubious about these
time frames that you're telling him he's going to face. Then you
take all of this material and try to put it together into a critical
path for the project. Soon thereafter, you find that, inevitably, the
critical path will not close, because when those laws were put to-
gether in the Seventies they were not put together with the con-
cept of procedurally taking a project from beginning to end to
reach a decision. Instead, although the Seventies was the great
master plan decade, when we master planned everything, we
didn't master plan our legislative scheme and our permitting
schemes. We did it very eclectically. We just threw one layer of
regulation on top of another. Thus, it is usually physically impos-
sible, under existing laws, for a major energy oriented project to
get from the beginning to the end of the process.
While establishing that, you've gone through a frustrating pe-
riod, but you've also done this: you've enabled yourself to give
the answers to the moderator's questions because you know
where the gaps are, and you know where you're going to need A,
B, and C before you can get to D, but there's another law that
says you've got to have D before you can get B. That's the kind of
problem that you run into in these permitting nets.
Generally, you start with the agencies. Even problems like that
can be worked out with the agencies, if the agencies have the will
to work them out. Additionally, I would say that, at the start of
every industrial project I've been associated with, you hope to get
through the thing without having to touch the legislature. You
hope that by working with all of the agencies you can come
through that process. Although we're talking about super projects
here, like LNG, Sohio, and so forth, there are industrial projects
that manage that task.
You only end up going to the legislature when you're panicked,
when you've tried your best and you can't work it out within the
agency level. Generally, this is because there are conflicting sin-
gle purpose agencies looking at the process from their own points
of view, which, very legitimately, have different, overlapping, and
contradictory policy objectives they've got to face. The big policy
objective in LNG is remote siting, which a lot of agencies would
want under their policy, versus a very sure Coastal Commission
policy of putting LNG in Los Angeles Harbor because it's got all
the infra structure, and you're not going to screw up a remote
area. Well, how do you resolve something like that?
At that point, if you are really stuck, you try to go to the legisla-
ture, and I think that happened with LNG. This morning I got the
feeling that 1977 was the beginning of the LNG world. As I recall,
in 1977, and all I know is what I read in the newspapers about this
thing, it seemed to most people that it was the end of the world in
1977. They'd already been frustrated by the agency process, and
that's why they were going to the Legislature.
The second part of the question was: do you have problems
with interagency rivalry? Well, of course you do because the peo-
ple who administer agencies are human beings. Nevertheless, I
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do want to deliver an affirmative message. I think that our gov-
ernment apparatus, at least in California, has learned from the
problems it had with Dow, Sohio, and a dozen other projects.
There is a very, very conscientious effort going on by the govern-
ment to attempt to set up means for dealing with interagency
problems. Among these means are: joint agency task forces; an
expanded role for the Governor's Office of Planning and Research
to mediate, knock heads together, and attempt to procedurally
solve these kinds of problems; and other techniques that Califor-
nia is trying to use to deal with the situation.
I think there has been a good deal of success in dealing with the
situation. Unfortunately, as was pointed out this morning, no ma-
jor industrial project has ever gotten to the end of the line. In
California, since this environmental decade of the Seventies
started, we really don't know whether that effort will culminate in
ultimate success, but I have high hopes it will. I think the new
awareness in state government of the procedural problems, is ex-
tremely helpful.
Geesman: I'd like to second those remarks pretty strongly, in
terms of the sequence of events. This LNG project is probably a
pretty good case study of that. You don't go into the legislature
unless you're in a panic situation.
In defense of the companies on this project, my recollection is
that they initiated contact with the Indonesians in 1970, and I be-
lieve it was prior to the original Arab oil embargo that they had
their first contract put together. They had negotiated what they
thought was a pretty sound contract under completely different
world conditions. They got tied up in a siting maze when permit-
ting agencies, at both the local and state levels, became aware of
the potential safety hazards, and then the brakes were put on. As
a consequence, the companies went to the Legislature. There is
still a great deal of debate in Sacramento as to whether or not the
1977 figures or statistics were put forward in good faith or not. I
don't think one needs to have a very firm attitude about that to
move forward on this issue. The one thing I'd say is the same
thing was going on at the federal level, because that was the very
same period of time when the deregulation of natural gas debate
was going on.
These applicants have wound through what, thus far, has been
a land use decision. Since then, we've gone through two major oil
price shocks on a world basis. The energy policy context has
changed entirely from what it was in the early Seventies when
the initial parts of the project were put together. As a conse-
quence, this is as good a case study as you can ask to see, in
terms of the way in which government works or does not work on
a major industrial project.
Looking at the electrical sector, on the other hand, it seems
fairly clear that from the utilities' standpoint, their best interest
has been served by forcing the state to make some fairly basic de-
cisions. They came to state government several years ago after
the first nuclear project had been denied by the Brown adminis-
tration and said: "Tell us what you want us to build. We've got to
build something. You indicate to us that you want us to build.
You indicate what type of sites will be approved, then we can go
forward." As a consequence, there's substantially less contro-
versy in that sector than there is in LNG today.
Greenberg: I'm sorry. I think you're comments are really very
good, John, but what you might not understand, at least I
wouldn't if I hadn't struggled with it for years with Sohio, is this
problem of forecasting oil and gas supply and how it comes into
the equation in any major energy project. When I first started in
1972, and I started because I had no input from this world before
then, I began reading those oil and gas supply forecasts that the
industry, government, and everybody else put out. You could see
what was going to be happening in the next five years. Then I got
to 1974 and found that every one of them was wrong; I explained
it all on the basis of the oil boycott in 1973. Well, when I got to
1976 and found that every one we were doing in 1974 was wrong, I
began to have a few doubts. As it turns out, every major effort at
trying to estimate what future oil or gas supply is going to be a
few years hence is dramatically wrong. I think the Iraqi-Iranian
War is a good example of why. We live in a future shock world.
If you take a master plan syndrome for making these basic deci-
sions, you say your first step is to figure out if the project is
needed. To do that, you have to figure out what is going to be the
supply of oil or gas. Inevitably, you're going to be wrong. The
human mind can't conceive of what's going on out there in the
world, and I would suspect that every projection we've got now is
going to be wrong five years from now. So where do we go from
there?
How do we put together a permitting net or a system for meet-
ing the situation when you've got to try to do your best to predict
these things, but you can't use them as solid building blocks upon
which you can determine what's needed and what's not needed?
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A utility always has to look at the worst case situation, because
they've got to supply the product. They've always got to take a
very conservative view as to what the supply of oil or gas is going
to be, in this case, gas. Hopefully, we can ensure that people will
never run out of their commodity, gas.
On the other hand, the regulator would look at it in a different
way. He would look at the environmental and economic problems
of bringing in more of this resource. He might even try to figure
what the best situation might be in the supply market, so that,
maybe, we won't need the project as much as the utility thinks we
need it.
These are both legitimate points of view. It all depends on from
what leg of the elephant you're looking at it. I would pose the
question to anybody who would comment on it: "How are we go-
ing to make these decisions when, based on past experience in a
future shock world, we can't get a real good idea of what the sup-
ply-demand situation is going to be in the future?"
Moderator: Interestingly enough, my last question was going to
be: "What happens when no one really knows what's going to
happen?"
McGinnes: My response would be that we start at the begin-
ning with the first question. Where do we begin when it comes to
the point where we are really throwing our hands up in the air?
Well, we come again to where it all begins. As professionals and
attorneys involved in the decisions that are going to be made in
the future and in the face of uncertainty, I think we have an obli-
gation to keep in mind that we are professionals. Even as we ad-
vise our clients, whose private interests are involved in these
questions of public policy, we, as individual lawyers and profes-
sionals, always have the duty to promote that which serves the
public interest and the public welfare.
The integrity of the process is what this case is about, partly.
It's that part that interests me the most. My expertise is not tech-
nical. My clients have nothing to contribute to that part of this
dispute. I represent native Americans whose relationship with
the land is not as near real estate or resources as mere commodi-
ties. Theirs is a love relationship. Where does this fit in?
Well, that kind of a connection which can't be quantified is diffi-
cult to fit into our legal system. To the extent that it is, I think
that our legal system is somewhat wanting. Our process must be
adequate for the participants of our whole society. So let's attack
the problem within a policy framework. The California Environ-
mental Quality Act speaks to that. To paraphrase, it is the duty of
every citizen to contribute to the long term preservation and en-
hancement of the environment. That's a duty which native Amer-
icans feel is their spiritual obligation, and it's now our legal duty.
The California Environmental Quality Act, as a matter of environ-
mental policy, says so. It also says that the long preservation of
the environment shall be the guiding criteria in public decisions.
Working within the policy framework throughout, we see that
we have to balance those duties with the need to provide energy
to maintain our accustomed lifestyle. What has happened in this
case, what perked my interest from the beginning, even before
my clients came to me, was that in this matter the balance was
skewed from the beginning. It was fast-tracked. As we've heard
in this morning's panel, and I won't reiterate what's been said, we
all agree that that was not the way to approach it. Let's not forget
that when we ask the questions we've asked here, where do we
begin and where do we go? Let's not fast-track these decisions.
Let's learn from this not to repeat the folly of trying to shorten
the procedure so that a sensible balance can't be struck. Com-
mon sense should guide our way.
Unidentified: All I'd like to say about that is, if this is a fast-
track, I'd hate to see a slow one.
Moderator: Well, there was a comment made this morning to
the effect that there were desirable benefits to be gained from de-
lay. Of course, there are serious costs to be suffered and to be
paid in doing so. Let me ask this question. I'm not going to direct
this to anyone because probably no one really wants to answer it,
yet it's one which everyone does deal with. How effectively does
a broad range of environmental data get into the process, and is
the process adequate for generating it at the earliest possible mo-
ment so that it's balanced against the energy aspects of the ques-
tion? Now, I put particular attention on a broad range of
environmental data. I know you have to fie environmental im-
pact reports, but you've got a broad range in that.
Unidentified: I think those of us who are familiar with other
projects which have been on the federal level since the early
1970's know that, at least at the FERC, each one of the applicants
is required to ifie his own statement, and then the agency itself is
also required, under law, to make an assessment on its own and
to evaluate the statement that has been fied. There is a circula-
tion of that document throughout other federal agencies which
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are considered to have an interest in the proceeding. It's also cir-
culated to everyone who was an intervenor in the proceeding.
That's for at least a forty-five day period. Subsequent to that, the
sponsor of the project ordinarily puts on its own witnesses. I
think, at the federal level, we put on between fifteen and twenty
environmental witnesses sponsoring a document, which must
have been three or four volumes, most of them at least two and
one-half feet deep and which was extensively cross-examined and
evaluated before an administrative law judge.
The next step at the federal level is the drafting of the adminis-
trative law judge's opinions, briefs on exceptions after that is is-
sued, and finally a decision by the agency itself, in which it
extensively considers each of the environmental issues and dis-
poses of them in a rather lengthy document. Finally, that too is
ordinarily subject to review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, which reviews whether or not the
legislative mandates have been complied with. We've been
through that process and have very extensively demonstrated to
the satisfaction of the agency involved that we're taking the ut-
most of care in carrying out the duties that we want to perform at
the site, taking into consideration all of the environmental factors
involved. The same conclusion was reached by the state after a
state document was also filed and evaluated by its own staff.
I think through the process of the independent study, done by
the state, the federal government, and the applicant, cross-exami-
nation of the witnesses, the submission of briefs and arguments
on those issues, an opinion by an administrative law judge, and
an opinion by both a federal and a state agency, are more or less
the ways the environmental issues are truly integrated in the pro-
cess right from the very beginning.
Greenberg: I hate to disagree with learned counsel, and I don't
really disagree with him. That's how it worked in LNG, and I
never thought of it before, but maybe that's one of the problems.
What he showed was a very well developed, well articulated pro-
cess. I think the process works in a much looser, sloppier, but
better, way. This assumes, however, that you're not within the
constraints of that kind of formalized, quasi-judicial approach to
producing environmental data.
In the Sohio project, land use project, the cement project I just
finished, and a few others, the way you work it is that you pro-
duce, as soon as possible under the California Environmental
Quality Act or NEPA, a draft EIR. Recent rulings have required
that, even in the predraft stage, if you know people who are inter-
ested and if you know governmental agencies which are inter-
ested, you must go to them at that very early stage so that they
can help you draft the scope of your environmental document.
Furthermore, the project doesn't really stay static. While all
this is going on, your engineers are working, you're talking to all
the agencies, possible changes are being evaluated, and as you're
producing this environmental document, all of that gets fed in. As
the description of your project changes from time to time in its
various stages, you run all those changes through all the groups
which have shown interest in your project because, from an advo-
cate's point of view on a project, you want to get the maximum
public input you can at the earliest time so that the least amount
of change will be required later and that, at least, some of the rea-
sonable opponents will begin to feel it's their project. They usu-
ally design half the mitigating measures that are going to be used
in it.
You then work with a joint task force of all the agencies. The
Sohio project started the idea of having all the agencies that had
to pass on the project, well, not all 732 of them, but those that
were on the pipeline, you know, the twenty or thirty major agen-
cies, actually work on the project of designing, scoping, and com-
menting on the environmental materials as you go. We found
that to be extremely helpful. In fact, I'd say Sohio reminds me of
another client of mine, a brain surgeon, who was describing to me
an operation he recently completed that he thought was abso-
lutely brilliant, but, unfortunately, the patient died on the table. I
think some of the processes that were used in Sohio and used
ever since by major energy projects that don't go through this
quasi-judicial mode have resulted in a much better governmental
understanding of the project.
One note of caution, however. As somebody mentioned this
morning, everybody wants an energy project everywhere but on
their own doorstep, and, in essence, that's the trouble with the
LNG situation. I think nobody would mind LNG, but don't put it
next to them. You're never going to get opponents like that to
view your project with anything but disdain. In fact, it's interest-
ing that on several projects some organizations, like the state Si-
erra Club or the Lung Association, all support the project after
you've talked to them and mitigated it to their satisfaction. On
the other hand, the local chapter of that same organization in the
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area is vociferously opposed to it to the end and even files
lawsuits.
That brings us to the final comment I'd like to make. No matter
how early and well done the environmental study is for the pro-
ject, it serves two functions. One is to inform everybody about it
and make you go through the rigorous analysis of your own pro-
ject so you'll correct environmental deficiencies. The other is to
set the stage for bitter lawsuits. I don't think that has been
touched on by the panel today, probably because LNG hasn't
gone that far yet. Nevertheless, it's going to face several years (in
the case of Sohio we figured five years) of litigation before it gets
through with all this. LNG has been going since 1970. When they
get their final permits, if they get their final permits, they'll have
several years of litigation on top of that. The environmental laws
are a wonderful arena for litigating because there are a million
unsolved questions on what is illegal or legally adequate and
what are legal procedures and what are not. Because so few ma-
jor projects have gotten to that stage in our country, at least in
California, those issues are all unresolved, and boy, I'd sure like
to put my grandchildren through school by representing some cli-
ents who have to litigate them someday.
Jonker: I'd like to address that, if I may. I think one thing that
is happening with the LNG case, which is significant, is the estab-
lishment of a seismic panel. This panel is composed of six well
known technical experts who are looking at all the seismic evi-
dence, and based on all of the evidence to date, they make a rec-
ommendation to the PUC. I think that ties in with what you said,
Mr. Greenberg, because it will reduce the length of litigation, and
I think, talking now with my engineer's hat on, that it is a good
trend, a welcome trend.
Mr. Warren is eloquent and has a lot of very powerful qualifica-
tions. One thing he's not though, is a scientist. As an engineer, I
was sitting here, and I was just flabbergasted by some of the in-
credible statements he made. They're absolutely factually incor-
rect. I have a list of them that I would like to go through, but we
had agreed we would not discuss the merits, and I will not. If
somebody would like to speak with me afterwards, I'd be glad to
respond, but I have at least eighteen points where Mr. Warren
was, from a technical and scientific viewpoint, absolutely incor-
rect, and that is a fact.
As an engineer, I would welcome the insertion of a body like
the seismic panel in our case, and I think that we'll see more of
that as we get into the tough decision areas. We've done a little
bit of that in the air pollution area, where Congress wrote an in-
credibly detailed clean air act which no one really knows how to
work with, even the agency involved. I think that a panel of ex-
perts is going to have to be installed in some air pollution cases as
well, and, again, I think it's a good trend.
Unidentified: I'd be willing to go over my notes too, with any-
one afterwards. I've got a lot of things that I have written down
about what speakers have said.
Following up on what Mr. Greenberg said about the process, I
would add to that one word, that in the environmental review pro-
cess, we must be careful as we design our decision-making mod-
els, so that we don't take the shortcut that the Legislature
decided to take in the case, which proved to be a mistake. Let's
learn from that mistake. Let's not take those fast-track shortcuts.
Moderator: Okay, Mr. Liss said that he also had a view on it, I'd
encourage him to participate in expressing that view, and I'm
speaking to you now of the person who basically controls or
guides the process along. How effective is the processing of the
scientific data which is generated, and, particularly, are the attor-
neys who are managing the process capable of handling that volu-
minous technical data, including the five feet? Would you like to
give your view, Mr. Liss, and then we can get back to our panel.
Liss: It's not so much a view, as just a concern, and I really
would be interested in hearing the experiences of everyone else
on the panel. I've been involved in the federal LNG proceedings
for years. Especially for law students, it would be a funny sort of
spectacle to see the adversary process at work with eminent ex-
perts on the stand. Sometimes you get the feeling that it doesn't
fit. When you walk into a courtroom and you're litigating an auto
accident case, it's a game, a very serious game, but it's a game.
You will bring as many resources as you want to it. The other
side will do the same. It's a weighing of the evidence. The judge
will then decide which set of scales is lower. And later on, you
may say, "Gee, well, we could have brought in some experts in
ballistics projection of automobiles." The judge will say, "Well,
why didn't you? That was your business. I didn't ask you to come
in here." That's what the adversary process is all about, and, in
that context, the process serves the community.
However, in the context of the regulatory process, the adminis-
trative law judges, who make the decisions, are supposed to make
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them, not on the basis of who put on a better or more voluminous
case, but based on what is in the public interest-that is their
mandate. I have no doubt that is what they are trying to do in
every case. But, you get a situation where, first of all, the kind of
evidence involved is so complex and so difficult to digest that you
wonder whether decision makers are really capable of it. Sec-
ondly, you get inequities in the adversary system that are inher-
ent, which make it even tougher for a judge to find the truth.
What happens in our case, for example, is that the people with
the most resources ifie a huge stack of evidence, and then it's up
to the other side to cross-examine the witnesses and to fie
whatever evidence they want to know. But what if the "other
side" is in the Sierra Club. They're involved in much litigation,
but they don't have the resources in every case to put on experts
in opposition, and they don't. So they hire lawyers who in effect
act as instant scientists trying to create a hole. Query whether
they can really do that in an effective manner. Similarly, you've
got parties who are in better shape than the Sierra Club, but who
nevertheless don't have the resources to put on the volume of in-
formation that the gas company is able to produce. I'm not saying
that from a provincial standpoint; my firm is involved in the other
side of many cases too. We represent clients who have many
more resources. But the problem with the adversary process in
the agency decision-making context is that you usually have un-
balanced records. Given the complexity of these decisions and
that it takes lots of good lawyers and lots of money to translate
evidence into something that a decision maker can understand in
order to really make a reasoned decision, and given that in any
case either one side or the other is going to have a large resources
advantage, I wonder whether the decision makers have the exper-
tise or have before them the type of evidence which would enable
them to make an intelligent decision.
I'm really talking about two questions. One is the inequity in
resources, and the second is, even if you had equal resources, can
the decision maker understand the evidence anyway? Do they re-
ally understand this siting business? Do they really care? Do
they have any incentive to get beneath it all and figure it out. It's
a very strange problem. I don't have solutions, obviously; I just
have a lot of reservations about the process. As Peter Jonker
said, the panel solution may be a better approach in many cases,
but it really is a disturbing aspect of public interest decision-mak-
ing in complex cases like this one.
Baird: I'd like to make a comment on that aspect. I agree that
the best thing the PUC has done so far is to establish a panel, and
it was one of the Coastal Commission's positions in the original
decision which was rejected by the Public Utilities Commission.
Moderator: You're saying that it's kind of a learning response
from what's gone on?
Clarke: I'd like to comment on that if I may. Perhaps it would
be best to start out with the fact that my first position out of law
school was with the Federal Power Commission in Washington,
D.C.. I was there for three years, during which period I spent
some time in the Office of the General Counsel. I then spent
some time defending the Agency's decisions before the court. Af-
terwards, I was privileged to be an assistant to a commissioner
and drafted opinions the last year I was there and was intimate
with the decision-making process. I think I can vouch for the fact
that the commission that sat at that time, and I believe the com-
mission that sits today, at the federal level as well as at the state
level, does struggle with very technical problems.
Most of the problems that it struggles with,. however, are rather
day to day and mundane. That is to say, it's fairly familiar with
the way gas companies operate and what their problems are until
it comes up against something of the nature that we have in the
LNG case.
I think this is a unique situation. I wouldn't throw my hands up
and say: "Gee, it's hopeless. The agencies simply don't know
what they're doing." The agencies have large staffs, and they
have a lot of resources at their disposal, and many of the people
on those staffs are very competent. They do a very excellent job
in raising issues. To the extent that the federal agency lacks a
necessary expertise or technical ability in a particular area,
they're free to call upon the expertise of other federal agencies.
So, I think to overemphasize a lack of expertise on behalf of the
Washington agencies would not be a good starting point. I'm not
saying that's what Mr. Liss is trying to do here, but I think we
should remember the resources of the federal government are
very large. When they want to bring their resources to bear in
reaching a determination or in deciding an issue on the merits,
they have a lot going for them in being able to do that, probably a
lot more going for them than even the applicants that normally
appear before them.
Now, the PUC, under the LNG Terminal Act of 1977, has at its
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disposal a budget which is in turn being charged to the appli-
cants, so that we are, in effect, under the law, required to pick up
incurred costs in certain areas of the processing of the application
itself so that it doesn't unduly fall upon the agency. Therefore,
this creates a resource available to it that it didn't have before. It
also has the California Division of Mines that it has consulted
with in the area of seismicity.
So, I wouldn't want to overemphasize the fact that the agency
itself, simply because it doesn't have a full-time seismologist of
the stature of a Dr. Newmark, is necessarily in the dark or doesn't
know what the issues are or how to find their way to a proper
conclusion.
The agency itself felt that it was necessary, perhaps for both
sensibility, as well as political reasons, to establish a six man
body of experts not employed by the state or the applicant, and
who have no association with the site, and to ask them what they
think about the presentation and what their opinion is as to the
suitability of the site itself. I think this is an extreme situation
and don't think a panel is necessary in every case.
Moderator: Mr. Geesman.
Geesman: I'm not certain that the LNG case is a very good ex-
ample of the role, or desired role, of lawyers in the permitting pro-
cess. Our agency has had similar types of cases in the sense that
virtually all the permit filings that we've considered in our five
years of existence have been cases of first impression. We've had
nuclear cases, coal cases, geothermal cases, and some oil fired
plant cases. We found, after some fairly negative experiences in
the early years, it was quite productive to minimize the role of at-
torneys in the process. We've tried to keep the adjudicatory, ad-
versarial type of proceedings to as small a number as possible on
any given case and to only resort to it after extensive quasi-legis-
lative hearings, where the technical staffs of the applicant, the
agency, and members of the public get together and attempt to
narrow down what disagreements they actually have. In our ex-
perience, the attorneys have gotten in the way of the decision
maker's effort to ascertain reality, truth, or good public policy
more often than they've facilitated it. In the LNG case, at least at
the state level, the legislation created such a forced march on a
fixed time frame that I'm not certain the PUC had any alternative
other than to conduct things in an extremely quasi-judicial
manner.
I think we'll be missing some of the points that Mr. Warren
raised at the beginning of the discussion unless we focus on the
fact that the adversarial proceeding may very well have missed
some of the major issues. Those issues will affect whether or not
this project goes forward, should we rely on a country, such as In-
donesia, for a major proportion of our natural gas supply. Argua-
bly, that's the federal government's decision, and, arguably,
they've already come to some conclusion on it. The reality is that
the members of the PUC are human beings. They're going to
have an opinion on that issue, and, consciously or subconsciously,
that's going to enter into their ultimate decision. The cost of the
project is probably another very good example of some of the fail-
ures of the adversarial approach. You've heard from attorneys
this morning, estimates of 500 million to three billion dollars, as to
what the cost of the facility would be. That's the cost as seen
from the shoes of the applicant, the amount of capital that needs
to be raised to actually build the project. From the standpoint of
the decision maker, though, he or she has to take into considera-
tion the full cost to the rate payers over the thirty year life period
of the project. Our staff estimates that it will probably be about
sixty billion dollars when you factor in fuel costs. The compari-
son point that I'll put forward, just for reference, because I'm not
certain that I'd vouch for the figures, comes from the Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory. Their estimate is that conservation pro-
grams in the residential sector alone (they have no estimates for
commercial or industrial customers) could supply ninety percent
of the same volume of gas for fourteen billion dollars.
These are difficult issues to come to grips with in a strict evi-
dentiary, adversial type of proceeding. The reality is, public util-
ity commissioners read the newspapers, and they form value
judgments of their own. When they make a final decision on a
project, a variety of things enter into it. From an attorney's stand-
point, it is best if you can attempt to frame those issues early in
the process and come to some agreement as to how those key is-
sues are going to be resolved. It's really in the worst interest of
your client, if you're not able to spot all the key issues and force
the decision makers to come to some agreement on them.
Greenberg: That's a very basic and kind of profound question,
and it will run through all your roles as lawyers, if you're in the
energy field or land use field. One thing you must realize from
the start: engineers and lawyers will never be friends, just like
cattlemen and sheepmen. There is a basic, different frame of ref-
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erence between them. An engineer, because of all his training
and temperment, is an absolutist. Something is right, as Pete
Jonker said, or it's wrong. It is scientifically verifiable, or it is not.
A lawyer, because of all his training, is a relativist. He has an ex-
istential view of the world. Nothing is black or white; there are
only gray areas to him.
The differences in view create differences in perception, which
will bother you as you're representing either side on a matter
such as this. I don't know how many times an engineer for an en-
ergy company has told me I was nuts. They ask why I say do the
widget this way when everybody knows that the way you do a
widget is that way? It's been done that way for thirty years and
that's the way to do it. I, as a lawyer, on the other hand, say:
"Yes, but if we can only avoid doing it that way and arrange so
you don't have to go through three permit agencies up here and
avoid complications of somebody opposing us over here." Then
you've got to plead with them to stretch and use what we lawyers
would call his creativity and imagination to find an unorthodox
way to do something that he knows darn well could be done best
if you did it the orthodox way.
The engineer, on the other hand, is always furious at the lawyer
for taking an orderly project and getting it out of sync because of
some darn fool political or imaginary problem that may occur
three years down the line.
Well, that kind of dichotomy also applies in how you absorb en-
vironmental information. I think I agree with all the speakers; it
would be unfortunate for the lawyer to take a lead role in how
that's done. But again, I want to caution you that in most in-
stances, with most of these projects, the lead agency is not a pub-
lic utility regulatory commission. In that case, it's a very different
process. The agency probably does not have in-house expertise,
so it goes out and hires either a large consulting outfit or a master
consultant who knows where the best people in each area are.
Those are the people who put together a draft EIR. Then, if any-
body has any quarrel with what they've done, be it the opponents
or the proponents of the project, they can bring their own scien-
tists in. If it's a seismic problem, all the seismic people can argue
about it. If it's a bird problem, all the bird people can argue about
it. Actually, you come to a better result in what your final envi-
ronmental documentation is going to look like, and I wonder if it
wouldn't be possible to engraft upon the PUC regulatory type ap-
proach how you prepare environmental assessment of a project.
Moderator: I hope your distinction between engineers and law-
yers hasn't brought Mr. Jonker face to face with schizophrenia.
I have several more questions, but I think in all fairness that we
ought to give some time to audience questions. So what I would
like to do at this time is to spend maybe fifteen minutes or so on
some audience questions. After that, I've asked Professor Lutz to
play the role of God and try to bring order to this chaos, by mak-
ing some summary remarks. I've suggested to him that, perhaps,
the most germane thing is to say that the highest form of civiliza-
tion is learning to live without answers. However, he is going to
make some comments to try to tie this together in five or ten min-
utes, and then we'll adjourn. Let's open it up now for the ques-
tions that you'd like to ask.
Audience: Could the panel please comment on the proposed li-
ability insurance, if any, for this project?
Panel: I'm not that familiar with all the intricacies of the liabil-
ity insurance which we have taken out on the Point Conception
Terminal itself. I know that certain arrangements with the rail-
road have been made. To my knowledge, there hasn't been any
difficulty in acquiring a reasonable amount of insurance or requir-
ing a reasonable rate for any foreseeable accidents that might oc-
cur at the site itself. I can't really give you any more particulars
than that. That is something that primarily has been handled by
another department.
Knierim: I can't answer your question directly, but I would like
to make one point on insurance, which leads to risk, and that is
there just can't be any risk in an LNG facility. The reason I know
that is because the Coastal Commission is really working very
hard to push down my client's throat, concerning Hollister Ranch,
that the public should be allowed to wander over the beaches of
the ranch right up next to the LNG plant. I know the Coastal
Commission, a very conservative environmental body, would
never allow this to happen if any of those people might be injured
in a blowout.
Furthermore, I know the Coastal Commission realizes and is
absolutely confident that none of those people will do what some-
body tried to do about eight months ago by sabotaging the thing.
Somebody tossed something into a tank and there was an explo-
sion. That could be serious after the LNG plant is built, if it's
built, so I know the Coastal Commission has no fear about that. I
sleep much better at night knowing that there is such public con-
[Vol. 9:1, 1981] Energy in the Eighties
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
fidence in that body and in the lack of danger in an LNG plant.
So, you really don't need any insurance.
Audience: How do the scientists and engineers calculate the
probability of an explosion, and how does the application process
deal with the information?
Jonker: Something will happen when you leave here and drive
to your home in one times ten to the minus twelve. For instance,
it's probably much more than that. That really doesn't mean any-
thing to anyone. Does it mean you're going to get hit when you're
on your way home, or does it mean you're not going to get hit?
What does it mean? Agency personnel, as well as legislators, like
to see it in terms they can understand. So, the question that is
posed to people like ourselves, who are involved in trying to build
a project that, admittedly, has a very minute amount of risk con-
nected to it, like everything else does, is: What if? It's that type
of question. What if this or what if that?
Now, what we get is a scenario that we have to account for, that
really wouldn't happen in a billion years, even if you tried, but
still, we have to protect against that. I think that's where we get
into the area of overkill, and we're seeing a lot of that, not just
with our project, but we're seeing it all over the place. Mind you,
I'm not saying that we shouldn't be careful and should not look at
the risk. To the contrary, we should look at everything that could
go wrong, and we should guard against things that may go wrong.
But let's not let this thing get out of hand, and let's not assume
that we're going to have ten LNG tankers all colliding at the same
point, all losing their load at once, and all vaporizing at once.
We've had too many of these scares in the newspapers and every-
where else; they just are not realistic. Getting back to the seismic
panel, even though they may be talking in terms of probability,
ten to the minus whatever it may be, when it comes to responding
to questions by the body here, the PUC, I think they will be able
to put these things into perspective. I think that's what it's all
about, and as far as what Mr. Greenberg said, he's absolutely
right. Engineers and scientists do not understand lawyers be-
cause they don't think like lawyers, and vice-versa.
I would have responded to Mr. Nelson's question as to whether
lawyers are capable of handling this with a resounding no. In
fact, that's the reason I went to law school. I found myself at
Union Oil working many, many hours trying to educate lawyers
on basic scientific facts that were known to any freshman in
chemistry, physics, or whatever. Maybe I'm creating a lot of ene-
mies around here, but, unfortunately, that's the way it is, and I
think a lot more engineers and scientists should go to law school.
Greenberg: You're absolutely right. There's only one valid role
for a lawyer in an environmental process that I can see. That role
is to try to read those crazy statutes, keep his client on the
straight and narrow, and keep the government agency on the
straight and narrow, so that there's not a maze of procedures, and
that's not as easy as it seems. One of the things that drives engi-
neers nuts is that a lawyer probably cannot give a good answer to
even a procedural question in a complex EIR case because there's
no authority; it's brand new; it's first impression; every one of
those issues are capable of going all the way to the Supreme
Court. All you can do is take your best educated guess. That's
the proper role for a lawyer in this process, rather than trying to
play God in somebody else's field.
Moderator: And yet the adversarial role, as Mr. Liss says,
forces the attorney to be the manager of examination and cross-
examination of that scientific data, does it not?
Panel: I agree completely with the generalizations about law-
yers' tendencies versus engineers' tendencies. On the other hand,
if you're involved in a project permitting process and you're
against the project, then obviously you're going to grab onto the
uncertainty factor and try to trump it up as much as possible and
impose upon an agency the obligation to be sure beyond a reason-
able doubt that the thing is going to work.
On the other hand, if you're on the side in favor of the project,
you're going to do your best to "pooh-pooh" any problems and
say, "My goodness, there's always uncertainty." Those are the
roles that the opposing lawyers are put in.
I remember very early on in this case, I made the mistake of
asking one of the LNG's witnesses, "Isn't that possible?" The an-
swer I got back was, "It's possible that the moon is made of green
cheese, so you'll have to do a little better than that, if you're try-
ing to get uncertainty." That's the role lawyers are put in. It de-
pends on which side of the case you're on. You're either using
uncertainty as an advantage, or you're trying to downplay it.
Moderator: Yes, sir?
Audience: Certain panelists have commented on how safe LNG
is, yet just recently an LNG tanker truck in Spain exploded.
Panel: I'll take it very quickly. That truck in Spain was loaded
[Vol. 9: 1, 19811 Energy in the Eighties
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
with LPG under pressure. When the tanks burst, the LPG shot
out. That leads me into making a very important point.
The LNG that we store in our tanks and transfer in our ships is
not under pressure. It is not LPG. It's chemically different. LNG
is nothing more than natural gas in a different physical state. It's
in a liquid state. Once it is revaporized, you cannot distinguish it
from regular natural gas that comes out of the well. LNG does
not burn by itself. It does not, in fact it cannot, burn or explode
spontaneously as Mr. Warren has said that it does. It just doesn't
do that. It can't. In order for natural gas to explode certain things
have to happen. First, it has to be vaporized into natural gas.
Then, it has to mix with air in the proper proportions. If it doesn't
get enough air, it will be too rich to burn, just like the gasoline in
your car. Then, it has to be cooped up in a confined space, and
someone has to close the door on it and light a match. Yes, then
it'll explode; no one denies that-just like natural gas in your
stove or heater will do.
Audience: Wouldn't an ignition source be enough to cause an
explosion or at least ignite a flame?
Panel: That's correct. If you had an ignition source and you
had all that gas hanging over you, it would burn, but it would not
explode. There is a very extensive research program that has
been carried on for several years by the Navy and others at China
Lake. They have tried to explode LNG clouds, but have been un-
able to.
Incidentally, that leads me to another point. Mr. Warren claims
that LNG gas clouds are colorless. He obviously has never seen
one. It's not colorless; you can see it. It's a whitish cloud. Not
only that, he says that anything in its path is frozen and/or as-
phyxiated. That's not true. Our people walk through these LNG
clouds taking measurements. They're not frozen to death.
They're not asphyxiated. Those are facts I'm giving you.
In addition, the Coast Guard has looked at the possibility of
spillage and ignition. They have looked at what they call the
"maximum credible accident." The scenario is that a loaded LNG
tanker runs into the dock and spills its load all at once. Now,
when that happens, there is no way that you're not going to have
some ignition source. I mean, you've got metal to metal contact.
You're going to have an ignition source, and you're going to have
a fire. This fire, however, is going to stay confined to the area of
the accident. You're not going to have vapor clouds drifting fifty
miles over Santa Barbara and igniting everything in its path. The
original vapor that comes from the LNG is going to find a lot of air
around it, so it will burn at the edge and burn inward, but the gas
is not going to be a fifty mile radius cloud burning back to the
source, incinerating everything in its path. That is just not going
to happen. No one denies that LNG is a combustible substance.
What we do want to do is to put the dangers of LNG into perspec-
tive. It shouldn't be handled like water. It should be handled
with respect.
As far as our technology and knowledge of the substance is con-
cerned, we have worked with it for thirty years. Contrary to what
Mr. Warren says, the technology is not unproved. We've had
thousands of transoceanic voyages on LNG tankers without an in-
cident that cost a life or any loss to public property. In Japan,
we've got an LNG terminal with dozens of LNG tanks all bunched
together, all close to other harbor operations. The Japanese re-
spect LNG; they also know that if they handle it properly, it's not
going to explode and injure them without any reason. It's just
like the gasoline in your car. Each gallon of gasoline is equivalent
to an explosive power of fourteen sticks of dynamite. Now you're
sitting on a lot of sticks of dynamite when you drive your car
home. Are you going to stop driving just because of that? You're
not, and neither is anyone else. It just means that you're going to
treat your gasoline with respect, the way it should be. That's all
we're saying.
Audience: We've heard a lot about the permit web. I'd like to
hear some discussion of innovations and perhaps more about the
Energy Mobilization Board.
Greenberg: I don't know enough about the final evolution of the
Energy Mobilization Board to be able to answer that part of your
question. I remember in its early stages we suggested, at least as
far as the Sohio project was concerned, something like that be
done.
If you take the problem generically, I think a federal agency
with the authority to preempt, which is basically what you're talk-
ing about, is an idea that most people are not willing to live with,
and I don't think I'm willing to live with it. It's got problems in it.
Furthermore, I don't think politically it is something that the
fabric of our society will take. In Sohio's case, when we suggested
that California law be preempted, one supporter we certainly ex-
pected was the Senator from Washington, because, if the Sohio
project went through, you wouldn't need the pipeline in the
northern part of the country. Since he didn't want that pipeline,
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we felt he'd be with us. He was absolutely against us. The reason
he was absolutely against us is that elected officials feels, this
time California, next time it might be my state. Once we start
preempting state rights, where do we go from there? I think
there's a drag at that.
California has not had one of these major controversial projects
go through its permit net since 1970. Sometimes there is a public
quotient of not knowing exactly what's wrong, with the decision-
making process, but which knows the first task of a decision-mak-
ing process is to make a decision, and that's what we seem to be
unable to do. They're going to look for a man on a white horse to
come make it for them.
I think you saw some of that in'the Reagan election, where
they're going back to simplistic solutions. Maybe they believe
that trees cause a lot of air pollution; I don't know. But they're
looking for a man who can get us out of this miasma where we
can't make a decision. Sometime we're going to get that, and then
we will get something like an energy mobilization board. I fear
for the country when something like that happens. The second
part of your question was what innovations are we trying that
seem to offer some hope. I found in my coat pocket today, as I
was coming down here, something that I wrote at a conference
put on by Governor Brown two weeks ago, which 850 businesses
attended. The little thing says, "Once is not enough, cogenerate."
Eight hundred and fifty businesses came to a cogeneration con-
ference put on by the Governor of this state. I think most of them
did not particularly like him and his officials. However, his offi-
cialdom has set up a joint task force with private industry to work
on this energy idea of cogeneration and has overcome an amazing
number of problems with the PUC, the Energy Commission, and
three or four other state agencies. They're not quite there with
the Air Boards; there's still a problem in this area. They can even
work fairly well with Washington, except the Economic Regula-
tory Agency. They don't like cogeneration over there, because it
will stop California from putting in atomic plants, which they say
is the-way we ought to go in our future.
Other than that, it's been a tremendous experience as I've
watched it. I've seen one regulatory procedural problem and sub-
stantive problem after another erased by a state administration
that was willing to do it and willing to organize to do it. Once a
month we meet up there, and the Governor spends a lot of time
with it. That's why he gets a lot of attention, I guess. There are
reports, and everybody discusses what the problems are and then
solutions are suggested.
I think that's a marvelous decision-making mode, and I would
like to see it used for more than cogeneration. I certainly would
like to see it used for conservation and all the goodies, such as so-
lar power and other things of that nature. But I'd also like to see
some attempts in the tougher sectors. I think everyone will con-
cede that no matter how we conserve, no matter how much solar
power we use, there are going to be some unpleasant environ-
mental and economic throwbacks from our attempts to meet this
energy crisis. Anybody that doesn't think so is naive. We have to
organize our priorities to figure out which of the indignities we're
willing to suffer and which of the sources of energy we want to
permit. I would hope that Governor Brown would keep talking
about this new partnership between government and industry to
attack and solve these problems. I think all of us are somewhat
cynical about it, despite the fact I'm beginning to see some evi-
dence that might really be there. I think that would be a tremen-
dous step forward for California in getting over this problem. I
could ramble on about fifteen others. That hit me first because I
think it is the most dramatic thing that has happened in the last
couple of years in the field in this state.
Moderator: I hate to cut off discussion at this point, but be-
cause of another time constraint that we have, we need to end
questions at this point. Professor Lutz, I'd like to ask you to come
up now, if you would, and spend five or ten minutes giving us a
summary.
Let me say, before he does so, that I want to thank all of our
panelists who have participated this afternoon, including Profes-
sor Lutz and Mr. Warren for their speeches, and for all these gen-
tlemen, including Mr. Liss coming all the way from Washington to
be with us. I just really appreciate all the input and the discus-
sion which we've had and the gentlemanly fashion in which it's
been conducted, and we very much appreciate that. Thank you
for it, and I hope you'll join me in thanking them for it now.
Lutz: Thank you, Professor Nelson. I don't know whether to
thank you for this dubious honor, but I do appreciate the offer of
the position of "God" which you made earlier, and I also do not
accept. But I will defer that. I do feel like a flower child though
today, to some extent, and like a law student because I was sitting
in the audience during most of the conference, and I learned a
great deal. I was glad no one tried to employ the Socratic Method.
What have we learned? I was pretty active with my red and
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blue pens as the discussion progressed, and I think in the morn-
ing session we talked about the energy site selection process.
One can't be too amazed at the labyrinthine intricacies of that
process. The process is, especially for industry, a very frag-
mented one, which is frequently interrupted, and often legally
exposing.
I think the state agencies were agreeing to some extent with, or
at least suggesting, that they too were somewhat disenchanted,
maybe not with the work of their particular agency, but with the
process that dovetailed their agencies with other agencies and
levels of government. They often wondered what their role in the
whole process was, and, to some extent, they emphasized that
there is a permit net or web that sometimes defies clarification.
I think I also heard something about politics in the morning ses-
sion. The discussion about fast-tracking the process by the 1977
LNG Siting Act was quite interesting. It seems that in order to
avoid political problems or to avoid the extended public discus-
sion which might have ensued with respect to site selection, there
was initially some preference for fast-tracking legislation. How-
ever, since obtaining that legislation, there have been second con-
siderations about it.
What I had hoped to hear in the morning session, which maybe
I was too optimistic about, was what the preference of the people
involved really is. In other words, what site selection regulatory
process is really a preferred one. It seems that this is the greatest
debate going on. Everyone has a different position about it, and
each one can raise objections to the process from their perspec.
tive, but the solutions to this extremely fragmented process are
not forthcoming.
Mr. Warren spoke to us about feeding caviar to chickens, and it
was an extremely provocative talk. I was tempted to convert that
statement into the question: Will California be able to get drunk
on champagne when we can only afford beer? In fact, that's a
very good issue to consider. The points that Mr. Warren made,
with respect to need, approach, and reconsideration were very in-
teresting, and I think the panel members in the afternoon session
attempted to address a number of those comments, so I won't go
into them.
The afternoon panel focused on decision-making and, in partic-
ular, the lawyer's role in that process. It was interesting to note
that attorneys don't like legislators, or seemed not to, at least in
the early discussion. They said that they stay away from the leg-
islative process for fear, although I'm not sure what of. The pro-
cess is certainly political, and there are liabilities, I suppose, in
getting involved in that process.
We also heard that applicants and even agencies have a rough
time holding time still, and, in fact, that's what many of our laws
require them to do today. In terms of forecasting need, supply,
and price, agencies and applicants are forced into a mold of hold-
ing time still, using data available, and projecting that data to
reach valuable forecasts. Yet the point was made, and I think a
very good one, that this particular area of involvement is so vola-
tile that it is almost impossible to talk of 1974 prices of, say, petro-
leum in 1976 or make projections about 1980 in 1974, based on 1973
prices. It's just a very different thing, and when you work out the
equation and do planning on that basis, you suddenly find that
your whole equation and all your alternative possibilities may ac-
tually crumble or fall on account of new data. The master plan
syndrome that was discussed and the reliance on master plan-
ning, which is certainly a development of the 1970 legislation, ex-
tend the problem I just talked about-forecasting.
Another point made in the afternoon session had to do with the
extent and integrity of the process. In other words, whether it's a
process which is fair and able to quantify values in a risk or cost
benefit analysis in such a way so as to take into consideration
non-economic values. This is a very hard task for economists and
lawmakers, but, nevertheless, one which is certainly increasingly
entering our laws and which, I suspect, will have to be addressed
with much more creative efforts than it has been so far. The
question of how you value certain religious considerations are
very difficult, particularly if you're talking about small popula-
tions who hold those religious concerns.
The other questions about the extent of the process refer to
whether the process is too long, whether there should be a fast-
tracking or a long-tracking of that process, whether, as time
passes, evidence becomes stale and renders the decision-making
inadequate, and whether or not the applicants in the procedure
are often exhausted by the process. Certainly we have purported
allegations of that very fact in the Sohio and Dow situations here
in California and I also suppose in the LNG situation.
One additional point, I think, was made about the adversary
process and whether or not it serves the decision-making process
or clouds it. How do expert testimony and expert witnesses feed
into that process and assist it, or how do they make it ponderous
and less effective? The question of use of technological data in
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such proceedings is one of the most difficult aspects our adminis-
trative agencies deal with today, and one which I think condemns
lawyers to be technicians, as well as effective lawyers.
There was very much more said in the process of the discus-
sions. I'm sure you took notes much better than I did. I think I
will conclude with the fact that, as a law professor, I am some-
what prone to case studies and sort of attracted to them. This in-
deed is a case study of a very large magnitude and cast. It raises
many of the important issues, not only of energy siting and en-
ergy policy in California, but also of our time constraints. Can we
extract something from this discussion for the future? It is doubt-
less that energy is crucial to our economy, politics, security, and
environment.
There is something unique about what was said today. It
seemed that everyone had some questions about the process in-
volved. Where is our energy policy? How do we get there? How
do we find a way to deal with our energy future? As long as we
depend on specific cases, such as the LNG case or the Sohio case,
to define our policies, I think we are doomed to the sort of process
and the problems that we heard today. I'm not sure as a law pro-
fessor, lawyer, or citizen how we get beyond this project by pro-
ject approach, but it seems to me we have to work much harder to
clarify the future and what we want in terms of energy to be able
to work better towards it.
I'd just like to conclude by saying that I am very honored to be
a part of this very high powered panel that presented these dis-
cussions today. I am indebted, and I think we all are, to the fine
students, particularly Rick Paisley and Liz Sanderson, who have
put together this very fine program, and I'd like to give them a
hand. Thank you.

